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Article

Financial Weapons of War
†

Tom C.W. Lin

INTRODUCTION
1

Finance may be the most powerful weapon of war. It
moves armadas, armies, and squadrons. It funds troops and artillery. It endows suicide bombs and improvised explosive de2
vices. It pays for special forces and mercenaries. It underwrites
cease-fires and purchases surrenders. Finance is the weapon
3
that makes all other weapons of war possible.
† Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.
Many thanks to Kenneth Anderson, Derek Bambauer, Gary Brown, Rebecca
Crootof, Onnig Dombalagian, Jeffrey Dunoff, Charles Dunlap, Adam
Feibelman, Richard Gordon, Sean Griffith, Duncan Hollis, Eric Talbot Jensen,
Ann Lipton, Duncan MacIntosh, Gregory Mandel, Shu-Yi Oei, David Post,
Sasha Radin, Steven Sheffrin, Peter Spiro, Harwell Wells, and conference and
workshop participants at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University, Seton
Hall University School of Law, the 2015 International Committee of the Red
Cross Workshop on Autonomous Legal Reasoning at Temple University, 2014
Ontario Securities Commission Dialogue, and the 2015 National Business Law
Scholars Conference for their invaluable comments, exchanges, and insights.
Additionally, I am grateful to Thomas Helbig, Leslie Minora, and George
Tsoflias for their extraordinary research assistance. Copyright © 2016 by Tom
C.W. Lin.
1. See, e.g., IAN BREMMER & CLIFF KUPCHAN, TOP RISKS 2015 8–9 (2015)
(discussing the weaponization of finance); NICK RIDLEY, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE FAILURE OF COUNTER MEASURES 1 (2012) (asserting that money is
an “essential component” of terrorist organizations); JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL WARFARE 1 (2013)
(“[M]oney is what fuels the operations of the world’s rogues.”); Shima
Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480–82 (2014) (describing the sums of financing needed by terrorist organizations).
2. See, e.g., JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE
COMMISSION 19–30 (2004) (describing the financing necessary for terrorist activity, including Central Intelligence Agency estimates that al Qaeda spent
approximately $30 million annually in the lead up to the September 11th attack).
3. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2255, ¶ 6, 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2255 (Dec. 22, 2015)
(alluding to the importance of financing in warfare); FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
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This Article is about the financial weapons of war, their
growing importance in national affairs, and their wide-ranging
effects on law, finance, and society. This Article offers an early,
4
broad examination of the realities of modern financial warfare.
This Article descriptively and normatively explores the new financial theater of war, analyzes the modern arsenal of financial weapons, highlights emerging legal and policy concerns,
and proposes key recommendations for current and future financial warfare.
While policymakers, analysts, and scholars have long been
studying the respective, evolving fields of modern finance and
modern warfare, there has been surprisingly little meaningful
legal scholarship on the crosscutting realities of modern financial warfare. Drawing on a rich legal literature that spans the
5
6
7
laws of war, finance, and cyberspace, this Article seeks to fill
TERRORIST FINANCING 7 (2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf
(“Funds are required to promote a militant ideology, pay operatives and their
families, arrange for travel, train new members, forge documents, pay bribes,
acquire weapons, and stage attacks.”); JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR:
THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 3 (2008)
(highlighting the importance of finance in the war on terrorism).
4. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at ix–xiii (describing various efforts made
by the United States in financial warfare following September 11, 2001).
5. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 163 (2011); Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention To Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 179 (2006); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 817 (2012); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War,
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002);
Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747 (2012); Matthew C. Waxman,
Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE
J. INT’L L. 421 (2011); Jeffrey T. G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International
Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of
Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1247 (2014); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012); Tom
C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678 (2013); Jonathan R. Macey
& Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an
Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005); Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (2013); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200–04
(2008); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673–79 (2010); Charles K.
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010).
7. See, e.g., CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (J.
Ohlin et al. eds., 2015); SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-
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this understudied, underappreciated—yet critically important—legal intersection of war and finance.
This Article has two chief objectives. First, this Article
strives to offer an original preliminary understanding of the
expansive effects of financial weapons of war and modern financial warfare. Second, building on that new working understanding, this Article aims to identify and address larger,
emerging normative consequences for law, finance, and society
given contemporary realities relating to financial warfare. The
objectives of this Article are largely conceptual in nature; as
such, detailed discussions of issues pertaining to legislative
language, policy execution, and political economy will be the focus of future work. In pursuit of its two chief objectives, this
Article is mindful of a longstanding view that generally perceives economic and financial hostilities as activities that fall
below the threshold of warfare, but it argues for a different perspective under certain circumstances in light of developments
8
in recent history. Jointly, this Article’s binary objectives do not
seek to advance an elegant, comprehensive theory of financial
warfare. Instead, this Article aspires to provide an early, working conceptual blueprint for thinking and acting anew about
modern financial warfare. Such an endeavor to draw the dynamic and fast-evolving architecture of modern financial warfare will necessarily be a preliminary work-in-progress. Nonetheless, it is a blueprint that must be sketched and studied, for
the financial weapons of war have become too consequential
and too important to ignore or wait for a later time.
This Article unfolds this blueprint in four parts. Part I provides a general layout of the modern financial theater of war. It
describes the modern financial infrastructure as a globalized,
9
high-tech, American-centric system. It then identifies systemic
risks, discrete vulnerabilities, and a lineup of potential adver-

INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1011 (2014); Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103
GEO. L.J. 317 (2015); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1199 (1998); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023 (2007); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Nathan Alexander
Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. L. REV. 1503 (2013).
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part I.
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saries in this financial theater of war. Part I provides a sweeping survey of the emerging financial battlefield.
Moving from general to specific, Part II highlights particular armaments of financial warfare. Rather than provide an
exhaustive catalog of financial weapons, it offers a broad inventory of the financial weapons of war. It classifies the financial
weapons of war as analog weapons and cyber weapons. It accounts for traditional weapons like economic sanctions, antimoney laundering regulations, and banking restrictions, as
well as digital weapons like distributed denial-of-service at10
tacks, data manipulation hacks, and destructive intrusions. It
explains how these analog and cyber weapons are used in current conflicts with al Qaeda, Iran, the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), North Korea, Russia, and Syria. Part II examines
and explains the utility and evolution of these weapons in modern financial warfare.
Part III contends with new concerns. It asserts that the financial weapons of war present critical challenges for traditional laws and norms relating to financial hostilities,
11
cyberattacks, and non-state actors. It argues that certain traditional rules that governed finance and war in the past are illsuited for a fundamentally different present, and a dramatically distinct future. It does so respectful of conventional norms
and laws governing wars and armed conflicts, but mindful of
the need to adapt to new realities. Part III grapples with core
concerns posed by the financial weapons of war to certain fundamental principles governing war and finance.
Part IV offers new pathways. It proposes three pragmatic
policy recommendations that should be undertaken in the near
term response to modern financial warfare while larger issues
remain unresolved by global policymakers. It advocates for innovative cybersecurity incentives, advanced technological
stress tests, and comprehensive financial war games to better
12
prepare for threats in the financial theater of war. Part IV
suggests immediate forward steps to be seriously considered
while larger policy and legal disagreements are being deliberated and debated by global policymakers.
This Article ends with a brief conclusion. It reminds of the
growing and emerging dangers of the financial weapons of war.
And it signals, with hope and optimism, the possibility of tam10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
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ing the savageness of financial weapons, safeguarding the
economy of the homeland, and promoting the integrity of the
global financial system.
I. A NEW THEATER OF WAR
The new theater of war is the modern financial infrastruc13
ture. This new theater of war presents an extremely valuable
battle space for our adversaries because they may be able to
plunder funds for their efforts and cause widespread financial
14
panic and crisis simultaneously. Unlike previous wartime
theaters, the financial theater of war is less defined by geography and more by its critical functions, assets, and liabilities.
The financial theater of war presents new risks, threats, and
vulnerabilities for modern warfare posed by a cast of familiar
and unfamiliar antagonists.
A. THE MODERN FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The modern financial infrastructure serves as a new bat15
tlefield in contemporary warfare. In this new battlefield, instead of bombs and bullets, the weapons of choice are financial
16
and economic in nature. This new battlefield is the result of
advances and developments in information technology, geopoli17
tics, and financial regulation over the last half century. The
13. See, e.g., ZARATE, supra note 1, at ix (“Over the past decade, the United States has waged a new brand of financial warfare, unprecedented in its
reach and effectiveness.”); John Seabrook, Network Insecurity, NEW YORKER,
May 20, 2013, at 64 (reporting on the growing number of cyberattacks on the
American financial infrastructure).
14. See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet
Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 84 (2010) (“The international financial system is
such a large target for cyberterrorists because of the substantial rewards that
cyberterrorists stand to gain—from stealing large amounts of money to fund
other terrorist acts, to crushing the global economy by shutting down the international financial system, to more subtly affecting international markets by
eroding consumer confidence.”).
15. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Aiming Financial Weapons from Treasury
War Room, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at B1 (quoting Secretary of the Treasury
Jacob Lew, who describes financial warfare as “a new battlefield for the United States”).
16. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at xi (characterizing financial warfare as
one “defined by the use of financial tools, pressure, and market forces to leverage the banking sector, private-sector interests, and foreign partners in order
to isolate rogue actors from the international financial and commercial systems and eliminate their funding sources”).
17. See ERIC J. WEINER, THE SHADOW MARKET: HOW A GROUP OF
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modern financial infrastructure is an international, high-tech,
American-centric theater of commerce and conflict.
First, the modern financial infrastructure is an interna18
tional, interdependent system of intermediation. Finance connects the world as a source of capital for good and ill. It connects nation-states, private businesses, terrorist organizations,
19
rogue syndicates, allies, and adversaries. Contemporary financial participants and products operate in a complex, expansive global network that connects and crosses institutions, in20
dustries, individuals, and instruments across the world.
Nation-states invest in one another through sovereign wealth
funds and other vehicles. Commercial banks, investment
banks, exchanges, pension funds, sovereign funds, mutual
funds, and many other financial institutions are all interconnected like never before, coexisting in an expansive financial
21
ecosystem with numerous linked participants and products.
For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase, the largest American banking
institution, serves as a nexus for a panoply of counterparties
through a wide-ranging array of services and products that inWEALTHY NATIONS AND INVESTORS SECRETLY DOMINATE THE WORLD 17–25
(2010).
18. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 643, 645–50 (2015) (discussing the core functions of financial
intermediation).
19. See ZARATE, supra note 1 (“Money binds the world—now more than
ever. It has always been a source of power for nations, companies, and people.
It continues to be the lifeblood for terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates,
and rogue regimes.”).
20. See, e.g., IAN GOLDIN & MIKE MARIATHASAN, THE BUTTERFLY DEFECT:
HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES SYSTEMIC RISKS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
39 (2014) (“The global financial system has become more interconnected than
ever before over the past decade due to policy and regulatory changes that
have opened markets combined with the massive surge in computer power
. . . .”); MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED—
AND HAVE STILL TO LEARN—FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 182–88 (2014) (discussing various linkages in the global financial system); Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799, 800 (2006) (describing the proliferation of new financial instruments).
21. See HAL S. SCOTT, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION (2012); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 77, 96–
98 (2009) (discussing the financial system’s “interwoven network of financial
obligations”); Robin Greenwood & David S. Scharfstein, How To Make Finance
Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2012, at 107; Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 493–94 (2015) (noting that many “new investment
opportunities are linked in a complex, global web of interdependent institutions and instruments frequently governed by crosscutting bodies of law that
span multiple jurisdictions and regulators.”).
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cludes investment banking, commercial banking, lending, market-making, trading, clearing, custodial servicing, and prime
22
brokering. In fact, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of
Financial Research found that J.P. Morgan Chase was the most
interconnected bank in the world and had more cross23
jurisdictional activity than any other bank in 2015. Additionally, financial institutions play an important role in the global
market for commodities that are essential to many non24
financial sectors of the economy like oil, aluminum, and coal.
In recent years, financial institutions like Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs physically held such large stakes of commodities like oil and aluminum that they could significantly influ25
ence the global prices for those commodities.
While the financial system has long been global in nature,
geography matters much less now. In previous eras, the successes and failures of one institution, state, or instrument were
more readily contained and captured by borders and boundaries. In present times, the ripples caused by one institution,
state, or instrument move so much farther, quicker, and
26
stronger than before. This was made bluntly evident during
the recent financial crisis when volatility in the American markets for collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed se22. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28,
2013).
23. Paul Glasserman & Bert Loudis, A Comparison of U.S. and International Global Systemically Important Banks, OFF. FIN. RES. BRIEF SERIES 1507, Aug. 4, 2015, at 2–3.
24. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
113TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL
COMMODITIES (Comm. Print 2014); Nathaniel Popper & Peter Eavis, Senate
Report Finds Banks Can Influence Commodities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, at
B1.
25. See Omarova, supra note 6, at 311–23 (discussing the holdings and
influence of financial institutions in connection with commodities markets).
26. See Austin Murphy, The Making and Ending of the Financial Crisis of
2007–2009, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 125, 128 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010) (“The
failure of just one large financial institution might lead to the failure of one or
more other institutions that would then spread to yet more financial institutions in a contagion that was feared might end in the collapse of the entire financial system.”); Judge, supra note 6, at 659 (arguing that new linked products in the modern financial system generate new sources of systemic risk);
David M. Serritella, High Speed Trading Begets High Speed Regulation: SEC
Response to Flash Crash, Rash, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 433, 437 (noting the potential perils emanating from “the interconnectivity of financial
markets and their participants, as well as increased interconnections between
securities and their derivatives”).
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curities caused significant stress on the global financial sys27
tem. The more recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and its
cascading effects around the world, offers even more credence
to the notion of a global, interdependent modern financial in28
frastructure.
Second, in addition to being a global, interdependent system, the modern financial infrastructure is also a high-tech
system driven by new information technology and new commu29
nications technology. Complimentary advances in technology
and regulation over the last five decades have remade the inner
30
and outer workings of the financial system. Technological advances made computing power and capacity exponentially better, faster, smaller, cheaper, and more readily accessible for
31
everyone, including financial institutions. An Apple iPhone
27. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 7–16 (2011)
(explaining the deleterious economic impact of collateralized debt obligations
and mortgage-backed securities during the financial crisis); Kenneth E. Scott
& John B. Taylor, Opinion, Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard To Clean up, WALL
ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A13.
28. See, e.g., Clive Crook, Who Lost the Euro?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, May 28, 2012, at 10; James Kanter, After Talks, Eurozone
and Greece Fail To Settle Differences over Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2015, at
B3.
29. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 70 (1999) (“Not only were the stock,
bond, currency, commodity, and other markets managed and maintained by
computerized networks, but the majority of buy-and-sell decisions were initiated by software programs.”); MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET
REVOLT 3–10 (2014); Markku Malkamaki & Jukka Topi, Future Challenges for
Securities and Derivative Markets, in 3 RESEARCH IN BANKING AND FINANCE
359, 382 (Iftekhar Hasan & William C. Hunter eds., 2003) (“At the end of [the]
1990s, between 30% and 40% of all U.S. securities were channeled through the
Internet and about 15% of all the U.S. equity trades were done on-line.”).
30. For a general discussion about the evolution of modern finance, see
Robert DeYoung, Safety, Soundness, and the Evolution of the U.S. Banking
Industry, 92 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 41, 41 (2007); Tom C.W.
Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 572–76 (2014); Loretta
J. Mester, Commentary: Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the Process of Financial Intermediation, 92 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA
ECON. REV. 67, 67–72 (2007); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of
the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation,
and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 215.
31. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING
TO OUR BRAINS 83 (2011) (“[T]he price of a typical computing task has dropped
by 99.9 percent since the 1960s.”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act,
101 GEO. L.J. 337, 347 (2013) (“Today, liquidity is now much more possible
outside of traditional exchanges. In the new millennium, cheap information
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today contains more computing power than all of NASA during
32
the first lunar mission. Along a similar timeline, regulatory
33
developments like Regulation Alternative Trading System,
34
35
Regulation National Market System, and decimalization
spurred the growth of electronic communication networks and
alternative trading platforms that linked financial markets all
36
across the globe. The net effect of the convergence of advances
in technology and regulation is a high-tech, modern financial
infrastructure.
In today’s financial marketplace, smart machines powered
37
by complex algorithms run much of finance. Financial tasks
that previously required human teams to exert hours, days,
and weeks of effort have gradually been replaced by artificial
intelligence, algorithmic models, and supercomputers that perand low communication costs have expanded markets . . . .”); Chip Walter,
Kryder’s Law, SCI. AM., Aug. 2005, at 32.
32. MICHIO KAKU, PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE: HOW SCIENCE WILL SHAPE
HUMAN DESTINY AND OUR DAILY LIVES BY THE YEAR 2100 21 (2011).
33. See Regulation ATS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2015); SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND
PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 68–78 (2012); BRIAN R. BROWN, CHASING THE
SAME SIGNALS: HOW BLACK-BOX TRADING INFLUENCES STOCK MARKETS FROM
WALL STREET TO SHANGHAI 2 (2010); DAVID J. LEINWEBER, NERDS ON WALL
STREET: MATH, MACHINES, AND WIRED MARKETS 31–64 (2009).
34. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2015); Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 49325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, 11,160 (Mar. 9, 2004); see also SCOTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, A.I. BANDITS, AND THE
THREAT TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 49 (2012); Laura Nyantung Beny,
U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory and Structural
Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 399, 426 (“[T]he express purpose of the NMS [is] to promote efficiency
and competition across secondary markets.”).
35. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DECIMALIZATION
4 (2012) (“Prior to implementing decimal pricing in April 2001, the U.S. equity
market used fractions as pricing increments, and had done so for hundreds of
years.”); CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO
RULE OUR WORLD 185 (2012) (discussing how decimalization bolsters electronic trading volumes and profits).
36. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 33.
37. See, e.g., LEINWEBER, supra note 33 (chronicling the rise of new, electronic financial markets); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 6, at 563 (“Advances in
technology, combined with the dramatic decrease in the cost of information
processing, have conspired to change the way that securities transactions occur.”); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street As Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 430 (2011) (describing
finance as “[a]n increasingly complex marketplace, [with] dependence on fastchanging technology”); Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Bull vs. Bear vs. Bot,
WIRED, Jan. 2011, at 90 (“It’s the machines’ market now; we just trade in it.”).
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form those tasks exponentially faster, cheaper, and in a more
38
user-friendly manner. High-frequency trading programs powered by artificial intelligence trade billions of dollars in securities and commodities across the world in fractions of a second
without any human assistance in public markets, as well as in
39
private dark pools. Autonomous supercomputers assist finan40
cial institutions in assessing risk and managing assets. Online
brokerages and automated wealth managers empower retail
41
investors to participate in finance like never before. Thus, it
should come as little surprise that a financial institution, J.P.
Morgan Chase, has recently been estimated to employ “more
software developers than Google and more technologists than
42
Microsoft.” In sum, the modern financial infrastructure is a
high-tech system where information technology is at the core
and foundation of the entire framework.
Lastly, in addition to being international and high-tech,
the modern financial infrastructure is an American-centric sys43
tem. Despite globalization and the emergence of other nationstates, the United States stands as the lone superpower in the
world. While geography may matter less in finance today, in
terms of financial influence and economic clout, America remains second to none. Our 2014 annual gross domestic product
44
of $17.42 trillion leads the world. Our currency is the reserve
currency of the world, and the most trusted investment during

38. See Lin, supra note 18, at 653–54.
39. See PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 46; Frank J. Fabozzi et al., HighFrequency Trading: Methodologies and Market Impact, 19 REV. FUTURES
MKTS. 7, 8–10 (2011); Graham Bowley, Fast Traders, in Spotlight, Battle
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at A1.
40. See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing
of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84
WASH. L. REV. 127, 130–35 (2009); Sheelah Kolhatkar & Sree Vidya
Bhaktavatsalam, The Colossus of Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Dec. 13, 2010, at 62; The Rise of BlackRock, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at
13.
41. See ANN C. LOGUE, DAY TRADING FOR DUMMIES 196 (3d ed. 2014);
John F. Wasik, Sites To Manage Personal Wealth Gaining Ground, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at F10.
42. CA TECHS., HOW TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN THE APPLICATION ECONOMY 2 (2014).
43. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at xiii (discussing the “centrality of American financial power and influence”).
44. Data: United States GDP at Market Prices (current US$), WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited Feb. 27,
2015).
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45

times of distress. Eighty-one percent of the global trade fi46
nancing is conducted using the American dollar. Because of its
importance, our currency is the most counterfeited currency in
47
the world by criminals and rogue states. Our markets in debt
and equity securities dominate the global capital markets. Our
institutions—both public and private—such as the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), stock
exchanges, and major investment banks are at the forefront of
international financial policies and practices. As such, when
America takes financial action, or when action is taken against
48
American financial interests, it has global repercussions. For
example, following the September 11th attacks, financial rules
and regulations promulgated by the United States against terrorism funding had a universal effect because of the unparalleled importance of the United States on the global financial
49
system.
To be clear, while the financial infrastructure is Americancentric, it is by no means completely controlled by the United
States. America’s financial power is stymied in part by the rise
of other geopolitical powers like the European Union and China. In fact, in 2015, China initiated the formation of the Asian
Infrastructural Investment Bank with numerous international
member states to serve as a financial counterweight to the
50
United States. Additionally, a significant portion of America’s
national debt is held by foreign nations, which has led national
security experts like former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, to remark, “[t]he most significant
51
threat to our national security is our debt.” Similarly, in a
high-tech financial framework, American financial institutions
and businesses face global competition and challenges, as sov52
ereignty matters less in the modern financial infrastructure.
45. ZARATE, supra note 1, at 9.
46. BREMMER & KUPCHAN, supra note 1, at 9.
47. See FRANK W. ABAGNALE, THE ART OF THE STEAL 80 (2001) (“[T]he
most counterfeited currency in the world is the American bill.”); DICK K.
NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33324, NORTH KOREAN COUNTERFEITING
OF U.S. CURRENCY 1 (2009).
48. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 12.
49. See Richard Barrett, Time To Reexamine Regulation Designed To
Counter the Financing of Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 7, 10–11
(2009).
50. See Jane Perlez, Rush To Join China’s New Asian Bank Surprises All,
Even the Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2015, at A5.
51. ZARATE, supra note 1, at 413 (quoting Admiral Mike Mullen).
52. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: Power in the Net-
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Rogue regimes and bad actors could attempt to undermine the
American financial dominance through new financial arrange53
ments and the invention of new virtual payment systems.
In sum, while the United States is the dominant force in
the modern financial infrastructure, other nation-states and
non-state actors will undoubtedly continue to challenge and
compete with the United States for financial and economic
54
power in the coming years.
B. NEW RISKS, THREATS, AND VULNERABILITIES
The modern financial infrastructure is both a valuable and
vulnerable theater of war. Former Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell estimated that a successful attack on
a large American financial institution “‘would have an order-ofmagnitude greater impact on the global economy’ than the
55
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.” This new financial theater of war
presents new crosscutting risks, threats, and vulnerabilities.
These new dangers can be broadly conceptualized as systemic
and discrete perils, though this distinction is frequently obscured in many instances.
1. Systemic Risks
The modern financial infrastructure is subject to critical
systemic risks and vulnerabilities due to its size, links, and
56
speed. First, in terms of size, there exists the well-known systemic risk of “too big to fail,” which has garnered much atten-

worked Century, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 94.
53. See generally PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF
CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND DIGITAL MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2015).
54. See ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: TRANSFORMING NATIONS, BUSINESSES, AND OUR LIVES 82–89 (2014); ZARATE, supra
note 1, at 385 (“Although the United States has had a near monopoly on the
use of targeted financial pressure over the past ten years, this edge is likely to
erode, leaving the United States both more vulnerable to external financial
pressure and less able to use financial suasion as a lever of foreign policy.”);
James D. Cox & Edward F. Greene, Financial Regulation in a Global Marketplace: Report of the Duke Global Capital Markets Roundtable, 18 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 239, 239 (2007) (“U.S. capital markets face more competition
than in the past.”).
55. David E. Sanger et al., U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Web Warfare,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A1 (quoting former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell).
56. See Scott, supra note 6, at 673 (“Going forward, the central problem
for financial regulation . . . is to reduce systemic risk.”).
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57

tion in recent years. “Too big to fail” refers to the systemic risk
where large financial firms become so integral to the stability
of the economy that the state has to bail out these private firms
58
with public funds when they are faltering. The existence of
“too big to fail” firms presents large, important, and vulnerable
targets in financial warfare. An attack on one or more of our
large financial firms can cause significant damage to our national welfare. The Financial Stability Board has designated
American financial firms like J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Wells
59
Fargo as Systemically Important Financial Institutions. In
2008, the failings of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers caused
60
catastrophic economic stress at home and abroad. Had either
of those firms failed because a foreign state or terrorist group
attacked them, the economic and psychological damage would
have been far more devastating.
Second, in terms of links, there exists the systemic risk of
61
“too linked to fail.” Because of the interconnected and interdependent nature of the modern financial infrastructure, a disruption to certain firms and components that serve as important economic nodes in the system could lead to widespread

57. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 15–
17 (2009) (reporting on the rise of too-big-to-fail financial institutions);
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM
CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 538–39 (2009) (discussing the policy challenges
presented by “too big to fail” institutions); Tom C. Frost, The Big Danger with
Big Banks, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304371504577406023330005352.
58. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1320.1(b) (2015); Amir E. Khandani et al., Systemic Risk and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect 48 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 10-023, 2010) (“[S]ystemic risk . . . arises when large financial losses
affect important economic entities that are unprepared for and unable to withstand such losses, causing a cascade of failures and widespread loss of confidence.”).
59. FIN. STABILITY BD., 2014 UPDATE OF LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT BANKS 3 (2014).
60. See Bryan Burrough, Bringing down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug.
2008, at 106 (detailing how speculation about Bear Stearns liquidity problems
turned into reality and caused Wall Street to falter); Carrick Mollenkamp et
al., Lehman’s Demise Triggered Global Cash Crunch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2008, at A1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids To Halt Financial Crisis Reshape
Landscape of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1 (stating Lehman
Brothers would seek bankruptcy protection after failing to find a buyer).
61. See Lin, supra note 6, at 711–17.
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damage and a significant blow to investor confidence. Distinct
from the systemic risk of “too big to fail,” the systemic risk of
“too linked to fail” includes smaller institutions and instruments whose distress or failure may ripple across the system
63
because of their linkages, regardless of their value or size. For
instance, in 1998, the Federal Reserve initiated a $3.6 billion
private bailout for Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge
fund with fewer than two hundred employees, because its demise would have generated significant losses for many investment banks and caused widespread panic in the international
64
financial markets. Since then, hedge funds and other financial
intermediaries have only grown larger in size, volume, and im65
portance, further exacerbating the risks of “too linked to fail.”
In addition to hedge funds and other financial intermediaries,
critical financial market components like clearinghouses, financial data farms, and securities information processors also
present vulnerable targets in the financial theater of war because they serve as essential links in a multiplicity of financial
66
networks. In 2015, the temporary failure of Bloomberg termi62. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, WHAT INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT CYBERSECURITY: HOW TO EVALUATE INVESTMENT RISKS 1–5 (2014);
SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 54, at 151–52; Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 200;
Waxman, supra note 5, at 424.
63. See FIN. STABILITY BD., ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (2014); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 200 (discussing the systemic
risks caused by financial intermediation and disintermediation); Shen Hong,
Everbright Fiasco Casting a Shadow, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2013, at C3 (reporting on the impact of a trading glitch at a medium-sized Chinese brokerage).
64. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT xviii–xx (2000); FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 261 (2003).
65. See Whitehead, supra note 6, at 5 (“Although hedge funds grew by
260% between 1999 and 2004 to become a one trillion dollar business, they
were largely exempt from regulation under the federal securities and investment advisory laws.”).
66. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663,
691 (2008) (“The longer the ownership chain . . . the greater the potential for
agency costs and valuation errors to creep in.”); Judge, supra note 6, at 685;
Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets,
101 GEO. L.J. 387, 389 (2013) (“Clearinghouses are stitched into the fabric of
the financial markets and intrinsic to their operation.”); see also Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
211, 215 (2009) (“[S]uccessful systems are those in which the consequences of
a failure are limited. This can be done by decoupling systems through modu-
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nals caused significant stresses in the global bond market af67
fecting billions of dollars in transactions. Bloomberg, it should
be noted, is not a large financial institution, but an information
services provider with about 325,000 terminals used by finan68
cial traders. Yet, because of its important connective role in
today’s financial network, its proper function is crucial to the
69
system’s linked stability. The same is true for many of the
other critical connective institutions of our financial system.
For instance, an attack on the systems of the publicly obscure,
but critically important, Depositary Trust & Clearing Corporation, which clears trillions of dollars in transactions daily, could
cause significant economic and psychological damage to our na70
tional welfare. Lest one thinks that such attacks on our economic and financial infrastructure are farfetched and unlikely,
two colonels of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army articulated using such attacks against the United States in a book about
71
war strategy and tactics.
Third, in terms of speed, there exists the systemic risk of
72
“too fast to save.” Transactions in the modern financial infra73
structure occur at velocities measured in the milliseconds. Billions of dollars move through cables and spectra across seas
74
and states in fractions of a second. While these astounding velocities can be beneficial in terms of efficiencies, they also inlarity . . . .”).
67. See Nathaniel Popper & Neil Gough, Bloomberg Data Crash Puts
Market in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2015, at B1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING CORP., SHORTENING THE SETTLEMENT CYCLE: MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK AND PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF
THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2014).
71. QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE: CHINA’S
MASTER PLAN TO DESTROY AMERICA 120–23 (2002).
72. See Lin, supra note 6, at 711–17.
73. See Fabozzi et al., supra note 39, at 8.
74. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3610
(proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (acknowledging the accelerating speed of modern financial markets); PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 46; A.D. Wissner-Gross &
C.E. Freer, Relativistic Statistical Arbitrage, 82 PHYSICAL REV. E 056104
(2010) (studying arbitrage opportunities for trading near the speed of light);
Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU1
(“Almost each week, it seems, one exchange or another claims a new record:
Nasdaq, for example, says its time for an average order ‘round trip’ is 98 microseconds—a mind-numbing speed equal to 98 millionths of a second.”);
Quentin Hardy, Testing a New Class of Speedy Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2013, at B1; Matthew Philips, Trading at the Speed of Light, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 2, 2012, at 46.
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crease the risk of error, volatility, and market misconduct be75
fore anyone can intervene to prevent the damage. Further
complicating the risks of “too fast to save” is the fact that many
institutions engage in similar and interdependent strategies
76
that are modeled on the same biases and assumptions. As a
result, an attack on, or a failing of, one participant or one product could create vicious cycles of volatility for the entire financial infrastructure as actions cascade and generate feedback
loops and spillover effects of serious systemic, adverse conse77
quences. On May 6, 2010, the world witnessed an unprecedented stock market crash called the Flash Crash, which was
78
allegedly caused by a single errant trade. In less than thirty
minutes, approximately $1 trillion in market value vanished
75. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 43
(2012) (“[O]ther studies show that during periods of high uncertainty . . . high
frequency trading is associated with increased volatility and sudden, abrupt
swings in the prices of stock.”); CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 71 (1999) (discussing the tendency for
failures or “accidents” to compound upon one another); Andrew G. Haldane,
Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the International Economic
Association Sixteenth World Congress: The Race to Zero (July 8, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/
historicpubs/news/2011/068.pdf); see also Fabozzi et al., supra note 39, at 29
(discussing how emphasis on speed and technology fragments the financial industry); Floyd Norris, In Markets’ Tuned-up Machinery, Stubborn Ghosts Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at B1; Matthew Baron et al., The Trading
Profits of High Frequency Traders (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://conference.nber.org/confer//2012/MMf12/Baron_Brogaard_Kirilenko.pdf
(finding that high-frequency traders profit at the expense of ordinary investors).
76. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3611
(“[M]any proprietary firms potentially could engage in similar or connected
trading strategies that, if such strategies generated significant losses at the
same time, could cause many proprietary firms to become financially distressed and lead to large fluctuations in market prices.”); Bernard S. Donefer,
Algos Gone Wild: Risk in the World of Automated Trading Strategies, 5 J.
TRADING 31, 32 (2010); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual
Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the
Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 810 (2010).
77. See BROWN, supra note 33, at 7; PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 9–10
(discussing the financial dangers of “a vicious self-reinforcing feedback loop”);
Louise Story & Graham Bowley, Market Swings Are Becoming New Standard,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1.
78. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 1–6
(2010); Graham Bowley, Lone Sale of $4.1 Billion in Contracts Led to “Flash
Crash” in May, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at B1; see also Nathaniel Popper,
Trader’s Arrest Raises Concern About Market Rigging, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2010, at B1 (discussing how the trading strategy known as spoofing contributed to the flash crash).
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79

from the U.S. stock market. While the Flash Crash was the
result of an alleged programming error, it is not hard to imagine foreign states and terrorist organizations attempting to
cause havoc on the homeland through similar attacks on our
high-speed, automated financial systems. For instance, with
the proliferation of automated trading platforms, cyber criminals can cause significant financial damage to the homeland
from the comforts of a remote location and without firing a single shot simply by injecting bad data and false trades into the
80
system.
2. Discrete Perils
Beyond the systemic perils, the new financial theater of
war also presents a multitude of discrete perils. The modern financial infrastructure’s heavy reliance on computerized systems renders it particularly vulnerable to targeted
81
cyberattacks. The Internet’s ubiquity means that any computer that is capable of being connected to the Internet is vulnera82
ble to attack and malice. As the former Director of National
Intelligence Mike McConnell observed: “[t]he United States is
fighting a cyber-war today, and we are losing. . . . As the most
wired nation on Earth, we offer the most targets of significance,
83
yet our cyber-defenses are woefully lacking.” Many serious
crimes and attacks against American corporations now involve
computers as the weapons of choice and cyberspace as the pre84
ferred setting. For many companies, software codes, intellectual property, and technological infrastructure represent some

79. Haldane, supra note 75, at 1.
80. See Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, The Code War, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, July 25, 2011, at 50.
81. See Hollis, supra note 7, at 1042 (speculating about computer viruses
that incapacitate stock markets); Scott Patterson, CME Was the Victim of
“Cyberintrusion” in July, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2013, at B5; Riley & Vance, supra note 80, at 52.
82. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN
SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE,
2009–2011, at i (2011); Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1022 (“The Internet makes
securing code much harder by exposing the inevitable bugs in software to sustained scrutiny and attack. Many—if not most—computers are connected to
the Internet directly or indirectly.”).
83. Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold War, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1.
84. See BARRY VENGERIK ET AL., HACKING THE STREET? FIN4 LIKELY
PLAYING THE MARKET 3 (2014); Riley & Vance, supra note 80, at 52.
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85

of the industry’s most valuable assets. General Keith Alexander, the former head of the National Security Agency and the
U.S. Cyber Command in 2013, called the loss of American business secrets and intellectual property to cyber criminals “the
86
greatest transfer of wealth in history.”
Enemies of the state can initiate numerous tactical cyber
strikes on American interests in the financial theater of war
87
causing serious harms and significant damage. This was made
alarmingly real by the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures, an Ameri88
can subsidiary of Sony Corporation, by North Korea. A number of similar cyberattacks have been made on American banks
and other financial institutions by foreign states and rogue or89
ganizations. While the full measure of the costs resulting from
such attacks is frequently hard to quantify, these costs are
nonetheless real and potentially enormous, particularly the intangible and psychological damages that fall out from these at90
tacks. Due to the amorphous and anonymous nature of
cyberattacks—and the reticence of corporate victims to come
forward—attribution, prevention, prosecution, and counter91
striking can all prove to be difficult.
85. See BROWN, supra note 33, at 49 (discussing the urgent need for blackbox firms to safeguard successful strategies for as long as possible); David
Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2011, at A11 (“Cybersecurity is now a major international concern,
with hackers gaining access to sensitive corporate and military secrets, including intellectual property.”); Alex Berenson, Arrest over Trading Software Illuminates a Secret of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at A1 (noting the importance of computer programs to financial institutions).
86. Seabrook, supra note 13 (quoting General Keith Alexander).
87. See Brown, supra note 5, at 182; Sean S. Costigan, Terrorists and the
Internet: Crashing or Cashing in?, in TERRORNOMICS 113, 117 (Sean S.
Costigan & David Gold eds., 2007) (noting the FBI estimated that cybercrime
costs the U.S. $400 billion annually); Kelsey, supra note 5, at 1434 (“If properly executed, the result of the cyber strike would be the same as a conventional
bombing raid but without the risk of civilian or military causalities.”); Seabrook, supra note 13, at 65 (“A large part of the nation’s financial infrastructure is under siege [from cyberattacks].”).
88. See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Attack, First a Nuisance,
Swiftly Grew into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2014, at A1; David E.
Sanger & Martin Fackler, Tracking the Cyberattack on Sony to North Koreans,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, at A1.
89. See infra notes 96–103.
90. See, e.g., JUNIPER RESEARCH, CYBERCRIME AND THE INTERNET OF
THREATS (2015), http://106.186.118.91/201504/Cybercrime-and-the-Internet-of
-Threats.pdf (estimating that cybercrime costs would be around $2
trillion by 2019); Nicole Perlroth & Elizabeth A. Harris, Cyberattack Insurance
a Challenge for Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at B1.
91. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN, WORM: THE FIRST DIGITAL WORLD WAR 48–
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Outside of the risks based in cyberspace, globalization has
also created more discrete vulnerabilities for American financial interests. Major American corporations have significant international footprints that can subject them to foreign economic
pressures and threats. For instance, Caterpillar, the multibillion dollar manufacturer of heavy machinery based in Peoria, Illinois, has operations in six continents, subjecting them to
serious financial risks from foreign governments and non-state
92
actors abroad. Similarly, Goldman Sachs, a New York-based
investment bank, has offices in over thirty countries with fifty
percent of their headcount and forty-two percent of their revenues coming from outside of North America and South Ameri93
ca. Every international office or facility of an American corporation like Goldman Sachs and Caterpillar can represent a
valuable target for our enemies in financial warfare, and an attack on a significant foreign office or facility of a major corporation can cause significant economic and psychological harm to
American interests.
C. NEW AND OLD ADVERSARIES
The financial theater of war presents a diverse lineup of
new and old adversaries relative to adversaries of traditional
theaters of war. In traditional warfare, nation-states with uniformed soldiers were the clear, predominant adversaries. In the
financial theater of war, adversaries are less clear and more diverse. In modern financial warfare, antagonists include famil53 (2011) (describing challenges in creating a cybersecurity defense system);
Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, On the Definition and Classification of Cybercrime, 2 J. COMPUTER VIROLOGY 13, 13 (2006) (“Despite the fact that the word
‘Cybercrime’ has entered into common usage, many people would find it hard
to define the term precisely.”); Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 874–77 (opining on legal challenges to addressing cyberattacks); Lynne D. Roberts, Cyber
Identity Theft, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TECHNOETHICS VOL. II 542
(Rocci Luppicini & Rebecca Adell eds., 2009) (acknowledging difficulties in
tracing the origins of cyberattacks); Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the CyberDragon, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2011, at 220 (“Because virtual attacks can be
routed through computer servers anywhere in the world, it is almost impossible to attribute any hack with total certainty.”); Christopher M. Matthews,
Cybertheft Victims Itchy To Retaliate, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2013, at B6; Chris
Strohm et al., Cyber Attack? What Cyber Attack?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Apr. 15, 2013, at 40 (reporting on the reluctance of companies to disclose cyber
attacks).
92. See Caterpillar, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9–11 (Feb. 18,
2014).
93. See The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1
(Feb. 28, 2014).
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iar foes like nation-states, but they also include less familiar
foes like terrorist organizations, lone-wolf hackers, rogue employees, foreign corporations, domestic criminals, anarchists,
94
and a host of cyber bad actors. Further complicating matters
is the fact that a technologically interconnected world has led to
the rise of cyber mercenaries willing to cause harm and havoc
95
for the right price.
Episodes from recent history reveal the diversity of potential adversaries engaging in financial warfare. In 2011, hackers
threatened Bank of America with stolen, corporate infor96
mation. In 2012, large, coordinated attacks, some attributable
to Iran, dubbed “Operation High Roller,” targeted American
97
and international financial institutions. In 2013, hackers infiltrated the Associated Press’s Twitter account to falsely broadcast an attack on the White House that temporarily erased
$136 billion in market value when automated programs traded
98
on the bogus news. In 2014, it was revealed that Russian
94. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2009) (involving
hackers who traded on illicitly-acquired, material, nonpublic information);
DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 9 (2015)
(“Criminal actors pose a considerable threat in cyberspace, particularly to financial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to further their
political objectives.”); BOWDEN, supra note 91, at 48 (“Today the most serious
computer predators are funded by rich criminal syndicates and even nationstates, and their goals are far more ambitious.”); INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC.
ALL., CYBER INTELLIGENCE: SETTING THE LANDSCAPE FOR AN EMERGING DISCIPLINE 7–9 (2011); SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF
MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 107–16
(2010) (discussing the theft of trade secrets from hedge funds); Eric Talbot
Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 232 (2002) (alluding to the difficulties of identifying a wide cast of potential cyber attackers);
Michael Joseph Gross, Silent War, VANITY FAIR, July 2013, at 98; Nicole
Perlroth, Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain of Command, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2013, at B1 (reporting on the difficulties of tracing hackers); Nathaniel
Popper, Wall Street’s Exposure to Hacking Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2013, at B1.
95. See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 103–22 (discussing the market for cyber
mercenaries); Matthew Goldstein, Need Some Espionage Done? Hackers Are
for Hire Online, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2015, at A1.
96. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Facing a New Type of Threat from WikiLeaks,
a Bank Plays Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, at B1.
97. See DAVE MARCUS & RYAN SHERSTOBITOFF, MCAFEE & GUARDIAN
ANALYTICS, DISSECTING OPERATION HIGH ROLLER 3–7 (2012); Nicole Perlroth,
Attacks on 6 Banks Frustrate Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at B1; Nicole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacks Were Work of Iranians, Officials
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at B1.
98. See Amy Chozick & Nicole Perlroth, Twitter Speaks, Markets Listen,
and Fears Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2013, at A1.
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hackers infiltrated the NASDAQ computer system, and they
continue to develop a sophisticated arsenal of cyber weapons to
99
use against other nation-states. That same year, a group of
cyber criminals dubbed as FIN4 hacked into the computer systems of Wall Street firms and other American corporations
with the goal of stealing information that could affect the global
100
financial markets. In 2015, it was revealed that an international cyber gang systemically stole millions of dollars from
101
over one hundred institutions around the world. Later that
year, an international syndicate of traders and hackers were
102
charged with operating a massive insider trading enterprise.
Furthermore, in recent years, China has been privately suspected and publicly accused of serious cybercrimes against
103
American interests. In fact, the United States took the extraordinary step of indicting five Chinese military officials in
2014 for hacking into U.S. corporations to commit espionage
104
and intellectual property theft.
In addition to an expanding cast of external adversaries,
financial institutions must also guard against potential inter105
nal adversaries. Rogue employees or contractors with author99. See FIREEYE, APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
OPERATIONS? 3–6 (2014); Michael Riley, How Russian Hackers Stole the
NASDAQ, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 20, 2014, at 40.
100. Nicole Perlroth, Web Thieves Using Lingo of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2014, at B1; see VENGERIK ET AL., supra note 84, at 3–4.
101. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Bank Hackers Steal Millions Via
Malware, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2015, at A1.
102. See Sealed Indictment, United States v. Shalon et al., 15 Crim. 333
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015); Sealed Indictment, United States v. Murgio, 15 Crim.
769 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2015); Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson,
Rogue Traders, Brazen Hackers and a Wave of Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2015, at B1.
103. See CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY: ESPIONAGE, STRATEGY, AND POLITICS
IN THE DIGITAL DOMAIN (Jon R. Lindsay et al. eds., 2015); DENNIS F.
POINDEXTER, THE CHINESE INFORMATION WAR: ESPIONAGE, CYBERWAR,
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND RELATED THREATS TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS 83–112 (2013); Barboza & Drew, supra note 85; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking Exposed 21 Million in U.S., Government Says, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2015, at A1; David E. Sanger et al., China’s Army Seen as Tied to Hacking
Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1; David E. Sanger & Mark
Landler, U.S. and China Will Hold Talks About Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2013, at A1.
104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us
-corporations-and-labor.
105. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1050 (“[I]t is not technologically possi-
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ization and access can cause some of the most devastating
damage to a country, its national security, and its financial in106
terests. Robert Hanssen, who spied for the Soviet Union and
Russia for over twenty years, and caused the most destructive
107
breach in domestic intelligence, was an FBI agent. Edward
Snowden, who initiated one of the largest leaks of classified
documents and defense programs in history in 2013, was a Na108
tional Security Agency (NSA) contractor. Similarly, a rogue
programmer or banker with access to critical infrastructure or
109
operational software can cause havoc for the financial system.
In 2015, it was revealed that a Morgan Stanley financial advisor allegedly stole over 300,000 confidential client account rec110
ords, and that information was later placed online for sale.
In sum, a diverse and expanding cast of familiar and unfamiliar foes in financial warfare makes this new theater of
war one of the most challenging terrains for present and future
battles.
* * *
Finance is the lifeblood of the American economy. Strong
and stable financial institutions make for a stronger America.
During the recent financial crisis when American investment
banks were in distress, the entire economy and country suf111
fered. Venerable American corporations like General Electric
112
had difficulties funding day-to-day operations. McDonald’s
ble to prevent those authorized to access data from misusing it . . . .”).
106. See, e.g., Steven R. Chabinsky, Cybersecurity Strategy: A Primer for
Policy Makers and Those on the Front Line, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y
27, 34 (2010); Robin Sidel, Banks Battle Staffers’ Vulnerability to Hacks, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-weakest-link-in-banks
-fight-against-hackers-1450607401.
107. See DAVID WISE, SPY: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE FBI’S ROBERT
HANSSEN BETRAYED AMERICA 7–8 (2002).
108. See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE
NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 2 (2014).
109. See Dune Lawrence, Tracking the Enemy Within, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 16, 2015, at 39 (reporting on the “insider threat” relating to cybersecurity from employees); see also MARK RUSSINOVICH, ROGUE
CODE (2014) (depicting a fictional account of a rogue programmer causing
global financial panic).
110. See Nathaniel Popper, Breach Puts Morgan Data up for Sale, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2015, at B1.
111. See SORKIN, supra note 57, at 417; Hui Tong & Shang-Jin Wei, The
Misfortune of Nonfinancial Firms in a Financial Crisis, in MEASURING
WEALTH AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND THEIR LINKS TO THE REAL
ECONOMY 349–51 (Charles R. Hulten & Marshall B. Reinsdorf eds., 2015).
112. See SORKIN, supra note 57, at 417.
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franchisees struggled to get loans to make payroll. General
114
Motors went into bankruptcy. And millions of Americans lost
115
their homes, their jobs, and their peace of mind. Given the
importance of finance to America and the intertwined nature of
modern economies, it should be little wonder that the new theater of war is the modern financial infrastructure, a place filled
with new risks, threats, and vulnerabilities targeted by a cast
of familiar and unfamiliar foes.
II. FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR
The armaments of modern financial warfare are as vast,
diverse, and important as the myriad of ways to raise and move
116
money. Broadly, the financial weapons of war can be divided
into analog weapons and cyber weapons, both of which can be
used for offensive and defensive purposes. Analog weapons include policy actions, such as economic sanctions, anti-money
laundering regulations, and banking restrictions. Cyber weapons include distributed denial-of-service attacks, data manipulation hacks, and destructive intrusions. Modern financial warfare often involves the concerted use of both analog and cyber
financial weapons of war.
A. ANALOG WEAPONS
Analog financial weapons have long been used in connec117
tion with warfare to cut off funding for adversaries. Ancient
Greek and Roman empires deployed financial and economic
118
tactics to decimate their adversaries. As a young nation, the
113. Id.
114. See ALEX TAYLOR III, SIXTY TO ZERO: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE COLLAPSE OF GENERAL MOTORS—AND THE DETROIT AUTO INDUSTRY 1 (2010).
115. See Alicia Parlapiano et al., The Nation’s Economy, This Side of the
Recession, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/06/14/business/this-side-of-the-recession.html.
116. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-163, TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS’ USE
OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS 9–22 (2003) (describing various
methods terrorist organizations use to raise money); ZARATE, supra note 1, at
384 (“The conflicts of this age are likely to be fought with markets, not just
militaries, and in boardrooms, not just battlefields. Geopolitics is now a game
best played with financial and commercial weapons.”).
117. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 9–17 (2009) (providing a historical overview of economic sanctions).
118. See KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
8 (2009) (“Indeed, Athens imposed economic sanctions in 432 BC when Pericles issued the Megarian import embargo against the Greek city-states which
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United States imposed the Embargo Act of 1807 to maintain its
neutrality in the war between Britain and France, as well as to
119
punish the British. Later in the twentieth century, during the
Cold War, the United States imposed a series of economic sanc120
tions against the Soviet Union and its Communist allies. In
the days following the September 11th attack on the United
States, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1373 applicable to all member states, which
required compliance with its International Convention for the
121
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Additionally, the
G7 nations, through their Financial Action Task Force, also
adopted several recommendations against terrorist financing
122
following September 11, 2001. Notwithstanding these efforts,
terrorist organizations and rogue nations continue to use duplicitous and clandestine means to gain access to funding in the
123
global financial system. As a result, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, despite all the technological advances in
finance, analog financial weapons continue to play an imhad refused to join the Athenian-led Delian League during the Peloponnesian
War.”); ZARATE, supra note 1, at 3 (“The Greek city-states, the Roman Empire,
and even the barbarians used sieges and economic deprivation to weaken their
enemies.”).
119. Embargo Act of 1807, 2 Stat. 451 (1807) (repealed 1809).
120. See Geoffrey Warner, The Geopolitics and the Cold War, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE COLD WAR 67, 80 (Richard H. Immerman & Petra
Goedde eds., 2013).
121. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 38349; S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
122. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION:
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2013).
123. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 116, at 14 (“To
move assets, terrorists use mechanisms that enable them to conceal or launder
their assets through nontransparent trade or financial transactions such as
charities, informal banking systems, bulk cash, and commodities such as precious stones and metals.”); MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS21902, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 2
(2004) (“Terrorist organizations are increasingly relying on informal methods
of money transfer, and regional cells have begun independently generating
funds through criminal activity.”); MICHAEL G. FINDLEY ET AL., GLOBAL SHELL
GAMES: EXPERIMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, CRIME, AND TERRORISM
1–10 (2014); Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 482; J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incorporation Transparency Act,” 70
LA. L. REV. 857, 857–62 (2010) (discussing the post-9/11 terrorism financing
methodology); see also Richard Gordon, Response, A Tale of Two Studies: The
Real Story of Terrorism Finance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 269 (2014),
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-269.pdf.
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portant role in the financial theater of war. Chinese military
officials have openly discussed using financial warfare in inter124
national conflicts. The United States, as the lone financial
superpower in the world, has creatively and effectively used
125
many analog financial weapons against its adversaries. In
the years following September 11th, the United States has
made concerted efforts to choke off funding for terrorist organi126
zations like al Qaeda and ISIS. Similarly, it has used denial
of access to the global financial system and economic sanctions
to respond to aggression by North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Rus127
Three general crosscutting categories of such analog
sia.
weapons are worth noting: economic sanctions, anti-money
laundering regulations, and banking restrictions.
First, in terms of economic sanctions, nation-states have
long used such policy tools as part of warfare and conflict, and
128
they have become more prevalent in recent years. Economic
sanctions are designed and intended to cause financial damage
and distress to an enemy in a hot war or a cold war. Economic
sanctions can be targeted against nation-states or specific individuals and institutions. The United States has had sanctions
129
against North Korea since the Korean War in the 1950s. Economic sanctions can include policies like asset freezes, import
130
tariffs, trade barriers, travel restrictions, and embargoes.
124. See QIAO & WANG, supra note 71, 39–41.
125. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at ix (“Far from relying solely on the classic
sanctions or trade embargoes of old, these [financial pressure] campaigns have
consisted of a novel set of financial strategies that harness the international
financial and commercial systems to ostracize rogue actors and constrict their
funding flows, inflicting real pain.”).
126. Id. at v–ix.
127. Id.
128. See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1354 (2004)
(“A powerful weapon in the U.S. government’s financial war on terrorism is
the use of economic sanctions against terrorists, terrorist groups, and their
private sponsors.”); Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 789, 789
(2009); Lowrey, supra note 15, at B1, B5 (“Over the last decade, as sanctions
have become vastly more sophisticated, the Obama administration has deployed them more and more often.”).
129. See BRENDAN TAYLOR, SANCTIONS AS GRAND STRATEGY 31 (2010).
130. See Jimmy Gurulé, The Demise of the U.N. Economic Sanctions Regime To Deprive Terrorists of Funding, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 19, 20–28
(2009) (explaining the evolution of economic sanctions following September 11,
2001); Nikos Passas, Combating Terrorist Financing: General Report of the
Cleveland Preparatory Colloquium, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243, 250–55
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China has used embargoes of rare earth minerals, which are
predominantly mined in China and crucial to electronics, to ex131
ert pressure on Europe, Japan, and the United States. More
recently, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) has overseen a host of longstanding and new
financial sanctions as a tool in modern warfare against American adversaries as varied as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard,
terrorist organizations, Mexican drug traffickers, and foreign
132
nation-states. For instance, in 2014, the United States and its
allies imposed a series of crippling economic sanctions against
Russia and several Russian citizens following Russia’s annexa133
tion of Crimea. More recently, in 2015, due partially to economic sanctions, Iran and the key stakeholders in the international community reached a historic agreement that attempts
134
to limit its nuclear weapons program.
Second, in terms of anti-money laundering regulations, nation-states have been more aggressive and expansive in using
such regulations to prevent the flow of ill-gotten gains and legitimate capital towards funding terrorist and enemy war ef135
forts. Anti-money laundering regulations have placed finan136
cial institutions at the frontlines of financial warfare.
Financial institutions are now required to identify their customers and report suspicious financial transactions to govern(2009) (describing restrictive designations and asset freezes in connection with
terrorist financing); Lowrey, supra note 15.
131. See Keith Bradsher, China Said To Widen Its Embargo of Minerals,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at B1.
132. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEP’T. OF TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (2015); Lowrey,
supra note 15, at B1.
133. Peter Baker, Obama Signals Support for New U.S. Sanctions To Pressure Russian Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, at A14.
134. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, WASH. POST (July 14, 2015),
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran
-nuclear-deal/1651.
135. See, e.g., U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing—HSBC Case History: Hearing Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. 10–12 (2012) (statement of David S. Cohen, Undersecretary
for Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, Dep’t of the Treasury); Baradaran et al.,
supra note 1, at 488–90 (describing anti-money laundering efforts initiated by
the United States); Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money:
Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism
Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 503, 505 (2011) (“Over the past forty
years anti-money laundering rules have been expanded . . . .”).
136. See Richard K. Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions
and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 702–05 (2008).

2016]

FINANCIAL WEAPONS

1403

ment authorities or they could be subject to criminal prosecu137
tion. Following the September 11, 2001 attack on the United
States, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed. Title III of the Act
138
focused on money laundering and terrorism financing. Additionally, post-September 11th, many nations joined forces to
help prevent the flow of funds to al Qaeda through new anti139
money laundering regulations. For instance, the Group of Ten
countries that manage the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), which is used for a significant percentage of global financial transactions, gave the
United States access to its database to track and trace illicit
140
flows of funds to terrorists and rogue nations. Documents
found in Osama Bin Laden’s compound revealed that the global
efforts to restrict terrorist funding had made it frustratingly
more difficult for al Qaeda to raise and transfer money around
141
the world. In current global conflicts with Russia, Syria, Iran,
and North Korea, the United States and its allies continue to
impose and enforce strict anti-money laundering regulations as
142
a tactic against its adversaries. Furthermore, in the current
battle against ISIS, one of the most well-funded terrorist organizations in history, the Treasury Department’s anti-money
laundering efforts, in particular efforts through its Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, are on the frontlines of this bat143
tle. ISIS has been estimated to possess in excess of $500 million in assets through ransoms, looting, extortion, and the capacity to generate $500 million from oil revenue annually to
144
fund its reign of terror. Because money is so critical to its
137. See id.; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Said To Avoid
Charges over Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at A1 (reporting on the
record $1.92 billion fine levied against HSBC for failing to comply with antimoney laundering regulations).
138. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
139. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, supra note 121; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 121.
140. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 49–59.
141. Id. at ix.
142. Lowrey, supra note 15.
143. See JESSICA STERN & J. M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 46
(2015); Rod Nordland, Iraq Insurgents Reaping Wealth as They Advance, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2014, at A1; David S. Cohen, Remarks of Under Secretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation (Oct. 23, 2014), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2672.aspx.
144. See Donna Abu-Nasr & Larry Liebert, It’s More Than Just Oil,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK., Nov. 23, 2015, at 11–12; Matthew Rosenberg et
al., How ISIS Wrings Cash from Those It Now Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
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reign of terror, these anti-money laundering regulatory weapons designed to cut off its funding are just as important in this
battle as traditional weapons of bullets and bombs.
Third, in terms of banking restrictions, nation-states utilize designations and bans to prevent their adversaries from
fully accessing the global banking system. Because of the interconnectedness of modern finance, and the central role of the
United States in it, such restrictions can render a nation-state
or organization isolated from the global financial system and
unable to secure financing for its war efforts and rogue operations since legitimate institutions fear the reputational risks of
145
being associated with rogue organizations. In a financial system that revolves around the United States, American financial
weaponry is far-reaching and can enlist foreign financial insti146
For example, as part of the war
tutions for assistance.
against terrorism, the United States designated certain charities and organizations as “terrorist organizations,” and denied
them access to the global financial system since any institution
conducting business with a designated organization would be
prohibited from engaging in financial dealings with any Ameri147
can entity, corporation, or individual. Additionally, because
the U.S. dollar serves as the reserve currency of the world,
banking restrictions have the practical effect of making it extremely difficult for a restricted party to conduct any meaning148
ful transactions around the world. In 2014, the United States
imposed a series of sanctions against firms and individuals
close to Russian President Vladimir Putin that essentially froze
those “individuals and institutions out of the vast swath of the
149
global financial market denominated in dollars.” More recent2015, at A1.
145. See P. EDWARD HALEY, STRATEGIES OF DOMINANCE: THE MISDIRECTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2006) (“American primacy gave the United
States unprecedented freedom of action and brought coercive diplomacy and
economic sanctions into the paradigm with much greater frequency . . . .”);
ZARATE, supra note 1, at 2–5.
146. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 349 (“The reality was that in the new age
of financial pressure and a global financial system, American demands and
practices applied globally.”).
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012) (“[T]he term ‘terrorist organization’
means an organization designated as a terrorist organization under section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
PROTECTING CHARITABLE GIVING 1 (2010).
148. See Juan C. Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies: Smart Financial
Power and National Security, WASH. Q., Oct. 2009, at 43.
149. Lowrey, supra note 15, at B5.
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ly, American regulators fined Commerzbank, a German financial corporation, almost $1.5 billion for providing banking ser150
vices for certain designated Iranian businesses. In sum, given
the importance of the United States in the global financial system, banking restrictions and designations could choke off access to any legitimate financial infrastructure for an adversary
and render them an outcast to much of the international finan151
cial community.
While no weapon and no defense can perfectly prevent every attack from an adversary, thoughtful targeted strikes using
analog financial weapons can seriously blunt the efforts of our
152
enemies. In recognition of the importance of the analog financial weapons of war, the United States has invested substantial
resources in building up its capabilities. The Treasury Department now has its own intelligence and counterterrorist unit
consisting of over 700 individuals with an annual budget of
$200 million to fight a diverse and expanding cast of adver153
saries using various analog weapons of war.
B. CYBER WEAPONS
As with the emergence of analog financial weapons, cyber
financial weapons have also emerged as critical armaments in
modern warfare with the rise and proliferation of the Internet
154
and information technology. America’s heavy financial and
military reliance on high-tech informational networks render it
155
particularly vulnerable to cyber weapons. The volume and
150. See Ben Protess, German Bank To Pay $1.5 Billion in U.S. Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2015, at B1.
151. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 24 (highlighting the isolating power of
banking restrictions); Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 251, 258 (2001) (describing the exclusionary effect of law as “outcasting”).
152. See ROTH ET AL., supra note 2, at 27; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra
note 3, at 27 (“Even the best efforts of authorities may fail to prevent specific
attacks. Nevertheless, when funds available to terrorists are constrained, their
over all capabilities decline, limiting their reach and effect.”).
153. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Following the ISIS Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2014, at B1.
154. See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 69–75; Hollis, supra note 7, at 1035
(“[Computer network attacks] for example, provides a new weapon that can be
deployed instantaneously and surreptitiously thousands of miles away from its
target.”); Barton Gellman, Cyber Attacks by al Qaeda Feared: Terrorists at
Threshold of Using Internet As Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2002, at A1; David E. Sanger, Document Reveals Growth of
Cyberwarfare Between the U.S. and Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2015, at A5.
155. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 94, at 2 (“A disruptive, manipulative, or
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varieties of cyberattacks on financial institutions, like all
156
cyberattacks, increase annually. In modern financial warfare,
the first shots of the battle are frequently fired in cyberspace.
As an early example, in 2007, during a dispute with Russia, the
Baltic nation-state of Estonia experienced a massive
cyberattack on its entire cyber infrastructure, which partially
paralyzed the country’s banking system and entire online in157
frastructure. Disclosures by Edward Snowden of classified
documents indicated that the United States had initiated over
200 offensive cyberattacks in 2011 against China, Iran, Russia,
and North Korea, many with important military and economic
158
implications. More recently, in 2014, around the time of the
Ukrainian presidential elections, it has been reported that
Russia unleashed a series of cyberattacks on the election commission, military forces, and other governmental entities of
159
Ukraine.
The truth of the matter is that cyber weapons of financial
war and cyber weapons in general have become more varied,
more sophisticated, and more prevalent in modern warfare. In
2013, General Keith Alexander, the then head of U.S. Cyber
Command, announced that the Pentagon would have thirteen
160
offensive cyber teams by 2015. A 2015 Pentagon report found
“significant vulnerabilities on nearly every” weapons program
161
under its control. A 2015 Wall Street Journal study reported
destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to U.S. economic and
national security if lives are lost, property destroyed, policy objectives harmed,
or economic interests affected.”); Waxman, supra note 5, at 424 (“[E]lectronic
and informational interconnectivity creates tremendous vulnerabilities, and
some experts speculate that the United States may be especially at risk because of its high economic and military dependency on networked information
technology.”).
156. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY
PRACTICES 1 (2015).
157. See Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia,
War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1.
158. See Barton Gellman & Ellen Nakashima, “Black Budget” Details a
War in Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2013, at A1; see also Michael Riley,
How the U.S. Government Hacks the World, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May
27, 2013, at 35–37.
159. See Margaret Coker & Paul Sonne, Ukraine: Cyberwar’s Hottest Front,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-cyberwars
-hottest-front-1447121671.
160. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Creates Teams To Launch Cyberattacks
as Threat Grows, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost
.com/2013-03-12/world/37645469_1_new-teams-national-security-threat
-attacks.
161. DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
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“29 countries now have formal military or intelligence units
162
dedicated to offensive cyberefforts.” A recent survey of American financial institutions indicated that attacks from other nation-states and hackers using cyber weapons are some of their
163
most pressing concerns. In 2013 alone, it has been reported
that “the average American company fielded a total of 16,856
164
attacks” from cyber weapons. In response to the rise of cyber
weapons, in 2015 President Obama issued an executive order
that empowered the Treasury Secretary to block the financial
assets of individuals that use cyber weapons to harm the na165
tional security and economic welfare of the United States.
Three broad, interrelated categories of such weapons are worth
highlighting in connection with financial cyberwarfare: distributed denials-of-services attacks, data manipulation hacks, and
destructive intrusions.
First, distributed denials-of-services (DDoS) attacks are
cyber incursions that attempt to disrupt and suspend the service of an online host to its users, and are one of the most com166
mon forms of cyberattacks. DDoS attacks frequently operate
by flooding a site with illegitimate traffic and requests until
that site is overwhelmed and all services are suspended. In
2008, Russia concurrently launched a cyberwar in addition to a
traditional war against Georgia by deploying a series of DDoS
167
attacks against key Georgian computer systems. In 2012, six
major American banks were subjected to DDoS attacks by an
organization called the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters
that rendered their online services temporarily inaccessible to
168
their customers and clients. A year later, major banks were
again subjected to another round of persistent DDoS attacks,

EVALUATION, FY 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 336 (2015) [hereinafter ODOTE].
162. Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Danny Yadron, Cataloging the World’s
Cyberforces, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
cataloging-the-worlds-cyberforces-1444610710.
163. Matthew Goldstein, Firms Wary of Breaches by Hackers, Not Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015, at B8.
164. Lev Grossman, The Code War, TIME MAG., July 21, 2014, at 20.
165. Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking
-property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m.
166. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 837.
167. See ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 66–90
(2010).
168. See, e.g., Perlroth, supra note 97.
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169

but this time from the nation-state of Iran. In 2015, it was
reported that China possessed a cyber weapon that could intercept and re-direct a tsunami of Internet traffic to sites that it
170
wanted to shut down. To date, DDoS attacks on our financial
institutions have all been temporary in their effects, but they
could cause serious and lasting damage. For instance, a successful DDoS attack on the New York Stock Exchange or the
NASDAQ during a normal trading day could cause massive financial chaos and possibly an economic crisis, to say nothing of
the psychological and emotional toll on American and international citizens.
Second, data manipulation hacks, or semantic attacks, can
serve as another powerful cyber weapon of financial warfare.
Data manipulation hacks or semantic attacks describe cyber
aggressions that are intended to plunder or maliciously alter
171
data towards destructive ends. Enemies of a state can hack
their way into the networks of financial institutions and steal
or manipulate critical data that then could be used to cause
economic chaos on a country and possibly the entire global financial system. Industry-wide studies about cybersecurity conducted in 2011 and 2014 indicated that financial firms were
172
most concerned with data manipulation hacks. Events in recent years give those firms good cause for concern. In 2014, it
was reported that Iran initiated a series of coordinated
cyberattacks in sixteen countries with the goal of stealing and
manipulating data related to critical infrastructure and finan173
cial operations. That same year, hackers attacked J.P. Morgan Chase and stole gigabytes of data that gave them access to
174
numerous customer accounts and millions of dollars in funds.
While much of the damage arising from data manipulation attacks has been limited, a far more damaging attack is foreseeable. The late popular novelist, Tom Clancy, described a night169. See, e.g., Perlroth & Hardy, supra note 97.
170. Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Tool Is Suspected in Web Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2015, at B1.
171. See MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CTR. FOR ADVANCED COMMAND CONCEPTS AND
TECH., WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? 77 (1995) (describing a semantic attack); Hollis, supra note 7, at 1042; Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations
and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 63, 67 (2010) (discussing the
effects of cyberattacks on data integrity and authenticity).
172. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 156, at 4.
173. Nicole Perlroth, Report Says Cyberattacks Originated Inside Iran,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at A14.
174. See Nicole Perlroth, 5 U.S. Banks Hit in Attack by Hackers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, at B1.
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mare scenario in his novel Debt of Honor, in which enemies of
the state maliciously injected falsified data into the American
securities markets causing global financial chaos as automated
programs instantaneously reacted to the bad information be175
fore it could be detected.
Third, in addition to DDoS attacks and data manipulation
hacks, destructive intrusion attacks are cyber weapons that are
176
used to destroy critical financial infrastructure. The antagonists would deploy such cyber weapons against a critical financial target with the goal of destroying the target rather than
disrupting it. During the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, the
United States considered launching a cyberattack to destroy
the Iraqi financial system prior to commencing bombing but ultimately declined to do so for fear of creating financial chaos in
177
the region. Similarly, a terrorist organization can attempt to
destroy the New York Mercantile Exchange by using a computer virus to attack the servers of the exchange in a manner that
would lead to systemic failures and chaos in the commodities
market. It has been alleged that, in 2011, the United States
and Israel unleashed Stuxnet, a computer virus superworm,
deemed by some at the time as “the most sophisticated cyber
weapon ever deployed,” to destroy an Iranian nuclear weapons
178
facility. Stuxnet destroyed the centrifuges in the nuclear facility by clandestinely reprogramming them to overwork until
179
destruction. A year later, it was reported that another computer super virus called the Flame—which some again attributed to the United States and Israel—was “afflicting com180
puters in Iran and the Middle East.” More recently, in 2015,
175. See TOM CLANCY, DEBT OF HONOR 294–312 (1994). While this scenario
may appear far-fetched, in the same novel Mr. Clancy also envisioned enemies
of America intentionally crashing jets into strategically important buildings,
which became a reality on September 11, 2001. See id. at 760–64.
176. See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Cyberattacks Seem Meant To
Destroy, Not Just Disrupt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, at B1; Seabrook, supra
note 13; Sec’y Jacob J. Lew, U.S Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the 2014
Delivering Alpha Conference (July 16, 2014).
177. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 170 (“[P]lanners had devised strategies
for a possible cyberattack to disrupt the financial structure of the Iraqi
state.”).
178. See William J. Broad et al., Israeli Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1; see also KIM ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY: STUXNET AND THE LAUNCH OF THE WORLD’S FIRST DIGITAL WEAPON 52–70 (2014).
179. Broad et al., supra note 178.
180. Andrew E. Kramer & Nicole Perlroth, Expert Issues a Cyberwar Warning, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2012, at B1.
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it was reported that the United States has embedded “surveillance and sabotage tools” in targeted computer systems of its
adversaries in Iran, Russia, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, and
181
other countries. In 2015, it was also reported that Russian
hackers had breached Pentagon and White House computer
182
systems, including some of President Obama’s emails. That
same year, it was alleged that China hacked into the computer
systems of the Office of Personnel Management and acquired
the private information of over 21.5 million people with ties to
the federal government, which amounted to “apparently the
largest cyberattack into the systems of the United States gov183
ernment.” While a major destructive cyberattack has yet to
occur in the homeland to our financial infrastructure or other
critical infrastructure, our adversaries are likely planning such
184
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
attacks.
warned a few years ago that the United States was facing a po185
tential “cyber–Pearl Harbor” in the near future.
Cyberattacks can be particularly challenging to defend
against, although public and private actors have made signifi186
cant strides in improving cybersecurity in recent years. Recognizing the seriousness of cyber weapons against the financial
187
system and other American interests, the federal government
has responded to this emerging threat with more aggressive
and strategic cyber-defense and cyber weapons programs in re181. Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, U.S. Embedded Spyware, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2015, at B1.
182. Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Read
Obama’s Unclassified Emails, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2015, at A1.
183. Davis, supra note 103.
184. See TED KOPPEL, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK, A NATION UNPREPARED, SURVIVING THE AFTERMATH 63 (2015).
185. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of
Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, at A1.
186. See, e.g., BOWDEN, supra note 91 (describing challenges in creating a
cybersecurity defense system); Gordon & Ford, supra note 91 (“Despite the
fact that the word ‘Cybercrime’ has entered into common usage, many people
would find it hard to define the term precisely.”); Hathaway et al., supra note
5, at 874–77 (opining on legal challenges to addressing cyberattacks); Roberts,
supra note 91 (acknowledging difficulties in tracing the origins of
cyberattacks); Gross, supra note 91, at 220 (“Because virtual attacks can be
routed through computer servers anywhere in the world, it is almost impossible to attribute any hack with total certainty.”); Matthews, supra note 91;
Strohm et al., supra note 91 (reporting on the reluctance of companies to disclose cyber attacks).
187. See Costigan, supra note 87, at 117 (noting the FBI estimated that cybercrime costs the U.S. $400 billion annually).
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188

cent years. In 2012 alone, the Air Force spent about $4 billion
189
on its cyber programs, and the Labor Department, in response to cyber threats, improved the computer security of its
190
valuable economic data. In 2013, it was revealed that President Obama possessed broad powers relating to cyberstrikes
191
against our enemies. That same year, President Obama also
issued an executive order aimed at enhancing cybersecurity,
and established the U.S. National Institute for Standards and
Technology Cybersecurity Framework to encourage the public192
private information sharing on best cybersecurity practices.
In 2015, the White House announced a new executive order on
cybersecurity and the creation of the Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center under the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence to better monitor and respond to cyberthreats; and
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 was signed into law as part of an
193
omnibus spending bill. That same year, the Department of
Defense also released a comprehensive white paper on its cyber
194
In 2016, the White House announced a
strategy.
Cybersecurity National Action Plan intended to initiate near
195
term and long term actions towards enhancing cybersecurity.
In addition to the panoply of government action, private firms
have also made greater efforts to secure their information sys188. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT (2011); DIV. OF
CORP. FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. Cf. DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2:
CYBERSECURITY (2011); WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD
(2011); James Bamford, The Silent War, WIRED, July 2013, at 90.
189. See Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Digs in on Cyberwar Front, WALL ST.
J., July 6, 2012, at A4 (stating that “[o]verall the Air Force spends about $4
billion a year on its cyber programs”).
190. John H. Cushman, Jr., Guarding the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2012, at B1.
191. David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in
Cyberstrikes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at A1.
192. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
193. Executive Order—Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information
Sharing, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity
-information-shari; see also House Amendment #1 to the Senate Amendment
to H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015) (amending the Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act); Damian Paletta &
Danny Yadron, Administration Creates Office To Battle Hacking, WALL ST. J.,
Feb 11, 2015, at A4.
194. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 94.
195. WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY ACTION PLAN
(Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact
-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan.

1412

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1377

tems and purchase insurance in connection with these at196
tacks. Despite all these efforts, as financial warfare grows
and evolves, perfect cybersecurity is impossible in an interconnected world, so industry and government sentinels must re197
main vigilant of the growing and evolving threats.
III. OLD RULES AND NEW CONCERNS
War poses problems for law. Cicero, the Roman philosopher and politician, bleakly stated that, “In time of war, law is
198
silent.” New concerns raised by the brutality and unpredictability of war, at times, render law unfit to address many of
them. Emerging financial warfare is no different. The policy
challenges posed by financial warfare are rooted deeply in core
tensions between the conventional laws of war and the realities
of the world. War and peace today look very different than in
eras past. In fact, the differences between war time and peace
199
time have become less distinct. As such, many of the old
rules, old modes, and old ways of the past are not suitable for
addressing some of the challenges of the present and the
200
emerging future of conflict and war. Questions and issues
about how longstanding laws and norms about war should govern financial hostilities, cyberattacks, and non-state actors are
at the heart of these core tensions.
A. OF FINANCIAL HOSTILITIES
The laws and norms of war—the jus ad bellum and jus in
bello principles—have long defined triggering events for war
and wartime conduct primarily in the context of armed conflicts
201
between and among nations. For instance, the North Atlantic
196. See Perlroth & Harris, supra note 90.
197. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1017 (“[T]here is a nascent realization
that . . . it is impossible to completely solve cybersecurity problems . . . .”).
198. MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 3 (2012) (quoting Cicero).
199. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 3 (2006) (“War and peace are
far more continuous with one another than our rhetorical habits of distinction
and our wish that war be truly something different would suggest.”).
200. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 5, at 1772 (“Increasingly, we find ourselves
addressing twenty-first-century challenges with twentieth-century laws.”);
David Wippman, The Nine Lives of Article 2(4), 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 387, 388–
90 (2007) (arguing that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter continues to be influential).
201. See, e.g., Todd C. Huntley & Andrew D. Levitz, Controlling the Use of
Power in the Shadows: Challenges in the Application of Jus in Bello to Clandestine and Unconventional Warfare Activities, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 461,
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Treaty Organization (NATO) in Article 5 of its founding Washington Treaty of 1949 states that “an armed attack against one
[member state] or more of them in Europe or North America
202
shall be considered an attack against them all.” Yet no clear
laws or widely accepted norms govern attacks that are economic and financial in nature where traditional arms are not used,
even though the damage can nonetheless be just as devastat203
ing.
Part of the tension that arises from attempting to apply
traditional laws and rules of war from the context of warring
nation-states to economic and financial hostilities is rooted in
the view that such hostilities are better understood in the con204
text of commerce, crime, and diplomacy, not warfare. This
perspective is supported by a longstanding understanding that
economic coercion is generally not considered a prohibited use
205
of force for purposes of international law. In fact, drafters of
the United Nations Charter considered and rejected the view
206
that economic coercion should be a prohibited use of force.
The United Nations, furthermore, has long used economic sanc207
tions as one of its governance tools. Additionally, states regu461–63 (2014) (explaining how terrorist groups threaten conventional war and
peacetime standards); Waxman, supra note 5, at 424.
202. North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S.
243.
203. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 31–36, 71–73 (2009); Waxman, supra note 5, at 422
(“Most economic and diplomatic measures, even if they exact tremendous costs
on target states (including significant loss of life) are generally not barred by
the U.N. Charter, though some of them may be barred by other legal principles.”).
204. See, e.g., DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15–17 (1999) (discussing the
purpose of economic hostilities in the context of diplomacy); Hathaway et al.,
supra note 5, at 445 (noting problems from applying traditional laws of war to
attacks on financial systems); Christina Parajon Skinner, An International
Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1194
(2014) (arguing for the use of international trade law to combat economic
cyber espionage).
205. See, e.g., Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525, 551 (2012) (“Article 2(4) [of the United Nations
Charter] did not categorize economic coercion as a prohibited use of force. Nowhere in the Charter is economic coercion prohibited.”).
206. U.N. Conference on Int’l Org., Amendments of the Brazilian Delegation to the Dumberton Oaks Projects, U.N. Doc. 2, G/7 (e)(3), at 252–53 (1945).
207. See JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 3 (2007) (enumerating various levels of economic sanctions
passed by the United Nations).
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larly and lawfully use economic coercion in dealing with their
adversaries, thereby giving more credence to the view that eco208
nomically coercive policies are not prohibited uses of force.
While this perspective is correct in many instances, it is not
correct in all instances. A severe, unprovoked tariff on American imports by a foreign state should not be considered an act
of economic or financial hostility in the context of warfare. Alternatively, a severe, unprovoked attempt to destroy the proper
functions of the New York Stock Exchange with the intent of
harming the American financial system by a foreign state
should warrant closer consideration as an act of war. These two
scenarios present easier cases. The more vexing cases arise
when the lines demarcating the spheres of commerce, crime,
209
diplomacy, and warfare blur and intersect.
Direct actions against American economic and financial interests in recent years by our adversaries have further obscured the distinctions among commerce, crime, diplomacy, and
warfare. Additionally, these attacks frequently do not distin210
guish between civilians and non-civilians. When a financial
institution is attacked, both civilians and non-civilians may be
harmed. China has been suspected of concerted state-sponsored
cyberattacks and espionage against private American financial
211
institutions for many years. The Russians have hacked into
the NASDAQ, and have made covert attempts to destabilize
212
our capital markets. Iran has made sustained effort to desta208. See Gervais, supra note 205 (“In practice, economic coercion is an accepted tactic in international relations. States regularly use loans, credits, and
foreign aid, among other means, to influence state action in designed ways.”).
209. See Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary
International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408–09 (1985); John Richardson,
Stuxnet As Cyberwarfare: Applying the Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield,
29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 11 (2011) (“Damage to these institutions . . . while not damaging physical infrastructure can have a far greater
impact on a state’s economy.”); Waxman, supra note 5, at 424–30.
210. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the
Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 134–36 (2010); Sales, supra note 7, at
1524.
211. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha & Ellen Nakashima, Google Attack Part
of Vast Campaign; Targets Are of Strategic Importance to China, Where
Scheme Is Thought To Originate, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2010, at A1; Dune
Lawrence & Michael Riley, A Portrait of a Chinese Hacker, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 18, 2013, at 54; Sanger et al., supra note 103; Sanger &
Landler, supra note 103.
212. See Riley, supra note 99; Benjamin Weiser, 3 Men Are Charged with
Serving as Secret Agents for Russia in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2015, at
A16.
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bilize our banking system through persistent cyberattacks.
Various non-state actors have also made serious attempts to
214
cause significant damage to our civilian financial institutions.
As cool and cold wars grow warm and hot, these tensions
between traditional laws of war and modern financial hostili215
ties will continue to persist. Therefore, American and international policymakers need to take a more proactive approach
with the governance of financial weapons in modern conflicts
by resolving the existing tensions of traditional laws of warfare
216
and contemporary realities. If a complete resolution of these
tensions is not possible in the near future, policymakers should,
at minimum, articulate a set of clear guiding principles for the
road ahead.
B. OF CYBERATTACKS
The traditional laws and norms of war and armed conflict
are not well suited to address many of the new concerns relat217
ing to attacks based in cyberspace. There are no clear strategies for cyberattacks despite the enormous potential financial
fallout and physical destruction that can occur from
218
cyberattacks. Numerous basic questions about cyberattacks
in the financial realm and beyond continue to lack a wide and

213. See, e.g., Perlroth & Hardy, supra note 97.
214. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 96.
215. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (2014) (describing the cool war between China and the United
States).
216. See Waxman, supra note 5, at 435 (suggesting a more expansive legal
view of wartime hostilities that includes harms like “a take-down of banking
systems, causing cascades of financial panic”).
217. See Brown, supra note 5, at 180–82; Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at
840 (“[A]pplying the existing law of war framework to cyber-attacks is extraordinarily challenging.”); Hollis, supra note 7, at 1023 (discussing how
states must wrestle with the emerging issues relating to information operations in cyberspace); Larry May, The Nature of War and the Idea of
“Cyberwar,” in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 6–15 (expounding on the differences between traditional wars and cyberwars).
218. See Hollis, supra note 7, at 1035; David E. Sanger, Countering
Cyberattacks Without a Playbook, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2014, at A3; Michael
Crowley & Josh Gerstein, No Rules of Cyber War, POLITICO (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/no-rules-of-cyber-war-113785.html; see
also JOE KLEIN, THE NATURAL: THE MISUNDERSTOOD PRESIDENCY OF BILL
CLINTON 190 (2002) (“[Following September 11, 2001,] the Treasuries Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers opposed cyber-warfare on
grounds that it may threaten the stability of the international financial system.”).
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219

clear consensus among key international stakeholders. These
basic questions are rooted partially in fundamental issues relating to sovereignty, weaponry, and governance.
First, in terms of sovereignty, cyberattacks raise pressing
220
issues about jurisdiction. As a general matter of international
law, a sovereign’s legal powers normally end at its borders, but
warfare in cyberspace pays little regard to national bounda221
ries. Is cyberspace a new extra-sovereign domain given its in222
herent extra-territorial nature? Scholars and policymakers
have wrestled with this question since the early days of the Internet, and this question has serious implications for laws of
223
war. The United States has defined cyberspace as “the inter219. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 320 (discussing how states “disagree
about almost everything” relating to cyber issues); Karl Rauscher, Writing the
Rules of Cyberwar, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 2013, at 30 (advocating for new international conventions on cyberwarfare).
220. See Johnson & Post, supra note 7, at 1367 (“Global computer-based
communications cut across territorial borders, creating a new realm of human
activity and undermining the feasibility—and legitimacy—of laws based on
geographic boundaries.”); Lessig, supra note 7, at 514–22 (describing various
regulatory challenges posed by the amorphous boundaries of cyberspace); May,
supra note 217, at 6.
221. See JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83 (David
Turns ed., 1995) (“The general principle of exclusive sovereignty over national
territory is firmly established in customary international law. Each State exercises control over its national territory to the exclusion of all other States,
and any limitation of this authority is subject to the consent of the territorial
State.”); ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF CYBER SECURITY 16 (2010) (“Whereas national legal authority is bounded by borders, the Internet is not.”); Kristen E.
Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Zero Step, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355,
368 (2015) (“[I]nternational law has traditionally operated at the level of sovereign States . . . .”).
222. See Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 1200–01; Eugene Kontorovich, The
Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45
HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 190–92 (2004).
223. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 476 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 391 (2006) (“There has
been a rich, and sometimes unnecessary, debate about whether indeed cyberspace is a ‘place.’”); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 476 (1998)
(“The Internet is not, as many suggest, a separate place removed from our
world. Like the telephone, the telegraph, and the smoke signal, the Internet is
a medium through which people in real space in one jurisdiction communicate
with people in real space in another jurisdiction.”); David G. Post, Against
“Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366 (2002) (“Communication in cyberspace is not ‘functionally identical’ to communication in
real space . . . . Furthermore, the jurisdictional and choice-of-law dilemmas
posed by cyberspace activity cannot be adequately resolved by applying the
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dependent network of information technology infrastructures,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer
systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical
224
industries.” The United States and a few other countries including China, Iran, Israel, and the United Kingdom have re225
ferred to cyberspace as a domain for military purposes. Nonetheless, unlike traditional warfare, there remains no clear
consensus on this important question relating to sovereignty
226
and jurisdiction. Traditional wars and armed conflicts take
place with more understood weapons and within less disputed
jurisdictions, be it air, land, sea, or space defined by laws and
227
norms rooted in geographic boundaries. The same cannot be
said about cyberspace and cyber weapons. While the individuals and the hardware that power cyber weapons may be based
fully within one sovereign, their actions occur in virtual space
and can have real world effects across multiple sovereigns. As
such, laws and norms that were designed to govern conflicts
among and between nations taking place in clear geographic
domains at times are ill-suited and impotent when applied to
228
cyberattacks.
Second, in terms of weaponry, cyberattacks create tensions
because their armaments of computers and computer code are
frequently not designed to harm adversaries in the same manner as traditional weapons of war like foot soldiers, bombs, and
229
bullets. What constitutes an act of war, an illegal use of force,
an armed conflict, or a lesser offense if the aggression is cyber
230
What and how should the law consider a
in nature?
‘settled principles’ and ‘traditional legal tools’ developed for analogous problems in realspace.”).
224. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW 1 (2009).
225. See DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013 37 (2013); Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 329–30.
226. Waxman, supra note 5, at 444.
227. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 827 (“Warfare traditionally functions in four domains—land, air, sea, and space—each of which is addressed
by one of the full-time armed services.”).
228. See Duncan B. Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty To Hack?, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 131; Eric Talbot Jensen, Future War and the War Powers Resolution, 29 EMORY INT’L L.J. 499,
537–39 (2015); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked
World Order, 40 STAN J. INT’L L. 283, 284–87 (2004); Sanger, supra note 218.
229. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 845 (discussing competing legal
views on cyberattacks); Hollis, supra note 7, at 140 (highlighting difficulties of
applying traditional legal doctrines to cyber attacks).
230. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Princi-
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231

cyberattack analogous to an attack in traditional warfare?
These questions are already complex for traditional operations,
but become even more vexing for cyber operations relating to
232
financial institutions and financial infrastructure. In the context of financial warfare, the intent of cyberattacks is often
rooted in destabilizing and harming an adversary’s economy rather than producing human casualties. The damage is frequently financial and psychological in nature, but nonetheless
233
devastating. For instance, in 2008, a malicious espionage
software program called GhostNet was discovered in the computer system of the Dalai Lama, and later in computer systems
located in over one hundred countries, including the systems of
234
foreign ministries and embassies. GhostNet gave an outside
party complete control and occupation of another party’s com235
puter system without detection. Had GhostNet been an elite
covert group of Chinese soldiers physically occupying and
commandeering the information system of another country’s
embassy or finance ministry towards destructive ends, the

ple of Non-Intervention, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 249–51; David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 87, 90–100
(2010); Hollis, supra note 7, at 1027–28 (describing nebulous classifications for
aggressions in cyberspace); Jensen, supra note 94, at 208–10 (questioning
whether an attack on a nation’s computer network constitutes an illegal use of
force under traditional international law).
231. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 180–82; Hathaway et al., supra note
5, at 843–46 (outlining competing perspectives on the inquiry of what constitutes a cyberattack); Hollis, supra note 228, at 180–82 (advocating for requiring “states to use cyber operations in their military operations whenever they
are the least harmful means available for achieving military objectives”); Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their
Duty To Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (2009); Sean Watts, Combatant
Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 391, 425 (2010) (asserting that traditional laws of war that govern uses of force should govern
cyber weapons as well).
232. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987);
Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 112th
Cong. 22 (2011) (prepared statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dep’t of State); Allison Arnold, Cyber “Hostilities” and the War Powers Resolution, 217 MIL. L. REV. 174, 180–82 (2013).
233. Sanger, supra note 218.
234. See INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING
A CYBER ESPIONAGE NETWORK 5–22 (2009).
235. See id. at 5–6; Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1014 (describing GhostNet
as “a sophisticated software program capable of covertly capturing keystrokes,
copying files, and even activating cameras and microphones attached to infected computers”).
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rules of engagement would be relatively clear. However, because GhostNet is a software program likely attributable to
237
China, the rules of engagement are not as clear. Attempting
to map rules and norms designed for weapons and attacks that
kill humans and physically destroy structures to weapons and
attacks that disrupt and decimate computer systems can be in238
credibly difficult. Part of the challenge is rooted in the fact
that cyberattacks can come in so many forms with a wide-range
of consequences that encompasses the temporary denial of service to a website to the destruction of a nuclear weapons facili239
ty. As a result of these challenges, to date, there are no widely accepted treaties or norms governing the use of cyber
240
weapons.
Third, in terms of governance, cyberattacks have created
breaks among nation-states and other stakeholders about how
best to govern cyberspace. Traditional warfare and armed conflict is largely governed by over a century of established and
widely agreed upon rules and norms (albeit with some disa241
greements). As previously noted, the same cannot be said
about the emerging war theater of cyberspace, where key
stakeholders possess competing visions of the best governance
models. The United States generally prefers a multiple stakeholder model of cyber governance where states, international
organizations, and private actors all play a shared role in gov242
ernance. The Obama administration has publicly declared the
United States’ commitment to “[p]romote and enhance multistakeholder venues for the discussion of Internet governance
236. Jensen, supra note 94, at 222.
237. See INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, supra note 234, at 48; Jensen, supra
note 94, at 235–36 (contrasting the rules of engagement for traditional attacks
and cyberattacks).
238. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 826; Hollis, supra note 7, at 1045
(opining on the challenges of translating existing rules of conflict into the context of cyberattacks); William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 108 (“The cyberthreat does not involve the existential implications ushered in by the nuclear age . . . .”); Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2012.
239. See Jensen, supra note 94, at 222; Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at
836 (asserting that “[c]yber-warfare can also constitute both cyber-attack and
cyber-crime”).
240. See Hollis, supra note 7, at 135–40; Sanger, supra note 218.
241. See KENNEDY, supra note 199, at 46–63 (chronicling the historical evolution of law and war).
242. Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 321.
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243

issues.” China and Russia, alternatively, generally prefer a
sovereignty-oriented model of cyber governance that gives indi244
vidual states most of the power. In fact, in early 2015, pursuant to its vision of cyberspace governance, China issued a series
of regulations that gave it even greater control over the Internet as used in China, including requiring companies, particularly those working with Chinese banks, to give government
regulators “backdoor” access to all computerized systems in the
country; those regulations were temporarily suspended later in
2015 after much protest from American banks and other corpo245
rations. Because of these dueling visions of cyberspace governance, there exists no meaningful international consensus or
accord on the governance of cyberspace and cyberattacks
among key stakeholders, despite their growing prevalence and
246
growing importance. For instance, there is no clear, widely
accepted agreement on the obligations of states regarding their
due diligence duties to prevent cyberattacks on other states
247
that originate within their sovereign territory.
It is important to note that this discussion about the difficulties of mapping traditional modes of law to cyberattacks
does not suggest that cyberspace is completely lawless, ungov248
ernable, or without shared values among key stakeholders. It
is understood that significant efforts have been made to expand
traditional legal doctrines to the realms of cyberattacks in recent years, and that international stakeholders can reach
agreements in critical areas concerning cyberattacks while
249
maintaining strong disagreements in other areas. Internationally, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excel243. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 188, at 22.
244. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 320.
245. See Andrew Jacobs, China Further Tightens Grip on the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2015, at A1; Paul Mozur & Jane Perlez, China Halts New Policy on Tech for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2015, at B1.
246. See Sanger, supra note 218.
247. See Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace,
125 YALE L.J. F. 68, 69–70 (2015).
248. See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 859–77 (providing an overview of
a patchwork of international law relating to cyberattacks).
249. See William H. Boothby, Methods and Means of Cyber Warfare, 89
INT’L L. STUD. 387 (2013); Eichensehr, supra note 7; Jack Goldsmith, How
Cyber Changes the Laws of War, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 129 (2013); Eric Talbot
Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack, 89 INT’L L.
STUD. 198 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 89
INT’L L. STUD. 233 (2013); see also GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENTS: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES 4 (2007) (discussing a theory
that highlights coexistence of conflict and cooperation among rival states).
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lence initiated a multi-year, multi-country study on law and
cyberwarfare, which culminated in the Tallin Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare as an important
250
compilation of guiding principles. In 2013, the United States
and other countries party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, an
agreement governing international arms sales, included intru251
sion software as a restricted dual-use technology. That same
year, the United Nations also issued a report of recommenda252
tions on information and telecommunications security. Domestically, when Congress passed the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act, it stated that offensive military cyber opera253
tions would be subject to the War Powers Resolution. More
broadly, the United States has taken the general position that
emerging issues relating to cyberspace do “not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor [do they] render ex254
isting international norms obsolete.” Additionally, the United
States has also taken the position that, to the extent that hostile cyber actions cause the same damage as traditional warfare
actions, similar laws and norms concerning self-defense will
255
govern. And in 2015, the United States and China reached a
preliminary agreement concerning broad principles relating to
256
cybersecurity. Nevertheless, despite recent preliminary ef250. NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLIN MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2013).
251. See Grossman, supra note 164, at 23; THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar.org (last updated Jan. 20, 2016).
252. See U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc.
A/68/156 (July 16, 2013); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, U.N. Doc. A/70/172 (July 22, 2015).
253. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011). But see Jensen, supra note 228,
at 538 (“Of course, being ‘subject to’ the WPR [War Powers Resolution] does
not mean it applies. It simply means that when it applies, the Executive
Branch will comply with its requirements.”).
254. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 188, at 9.
255. See id. at 14 (“When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All
states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain
hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the
commitments we have with our military treaty partners.”); see also Koh, supra
note 238, at 4 (“A state’s national right of self-defense . . . may be triggered by
computer network activities that amount to an armed attack or imminent
threat thereof.”).
256. See Memorandum of Understanding on U.S.-China Development CoTHE
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forts and working understandings, cyberattacks nonetheless
pose serious challenges for traditional laws and norms of war,
as many critical issues relating to sovereignty, weaponry, and
257
governance remain unresolved.
C. OF NON-STATE ADVERSARIES
Traditional laws and norms of war and armed conflict are
robust and rich in addressing the actions of state adversaries,
but they are not as well equipped to address the actions of non258
state adversaries. While non-state adversaries like terrorist
organizations have existed for centuries, much of the legal infrastructure remains better suited to address state adver259
saries. As non-state adversaries continue to play more prominent roles in modern warfare, tensions arise when old doctrines
260
mismatch new realities. Non-state adversaries present speoperation and the Establishment of an Exchange and Communication Mechanism Between the United States Agency for International Development and
the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., Sept.
25, 2015, https://www.usaid.gov/china/mou; see also First U.S.-China HighLevel Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues Summary of Outcomes,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-us-china
-high-level-joint-dialogue-cybercrime-and-related-issues-summary-outcomes-0.
257. See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, The Geography of Cyber Conflict: Through a
Glass Darkly, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 5–10 (2013); Eichensehr, supra note 221, at
370–75; Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 856.
258. See Nicolò Bussolati, The Rise of Non-State Actors in Cyberwarfare, in
CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 103, 102–06; see also Kenneth Anderson, U.S.
Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with International Human Rights Norms, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 455, 472 (2007) (opining that the
war on terror does not meet the requirements of war under traditional legal
understandings of the concept); Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 102
(2001) (“International law focuses on states, but the growing power of nonstate actors, such as insurgent groups, multinational corporations, transnational criminal organizations, and non-governmental organizations, is a challenge for traditional international law.”); Huntley & Levitz, supra note 201, at
482 (noting the debate concerning the applicability of the law of armed conflict
to non-state terrorists).
259. See generally MICHAEL BURLEIGH, BLOOD AND RAGE: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF TERRORISM (2010); THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUITY
TO AL QAEDA (Gérard Chaliand & Arnaud Blin eds., 2007).
260. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum & Philip B. Heymann, Law and Policy of
Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 147 (2010) (highlighting legal issues involved with killing alleged terrorists); David Glazier, Playing by the
Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
957, 962–63 (2009) (explicating the applicability of law in connection with nonstate actors); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 5, at 1260 (highlighting the constitutional challenges involved with trying terrorists); Michael Schmitt, Bellum
Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Im-
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cial challenges for the law because of the lack of meaningful
comity, reciprocity, and accountability.
In terms of comity and reciprocity, nation-states can readily enter into legal agreements that govern their wartime behavior and reasonably expect one another to cooperatively abide by
261
them. For instance, the Hague Conventions of 1899 banned
262
the use of certain poisonous arms in warfare among nations.
More recently, the United States, Japan, and a number of European nations have ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (a.k.a. The Budapest Convention) to govern
263
actions related to the emerging field of cybercrime. However,
unlike state actors, it is much more difficult to enter into legal
agreements about wartime behavior with non-state adver264
saries. Additionally, given their lawless and barbaric behavior, it is hard to imagine hackers or terrorist groups like al
Qaeda and ISIS ever reaching a formal accord or treaty with a
265
state-based adversary like the United States. This discussion
on the lack of comity and reciprocity does not mean to suggest
that in dealing with non-state adversaries state actors should
ignore all the laws and norms of war and armed conflict. Ultimately, as President Obama stated in his 2009 Nobel Lecture,
plications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051, 1073–74
(1998) (“If twenty-first century national security threats are to come from nonstate actors, then the law governing the resort to force is bound to evolve in a
way that permits an effective defense against them . . . .”).
261. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 18 (2008) (describing how reciprocity and rational
choice engenders cooperation among states); GOLNOOSH HAKIMDAVAR, A
STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING OF UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT 136 (2014) (explaining how states generally interact on a rational basis with other states); Daphné RichemondBarak, Applicability and Application of the Laws of War to Modern Conflicts,
23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 327, 328 (2011) (“‘Reciprocity’ in international law refers to
the expectation by a belligerent state that other state parties to a conflict will
respect similar legal and behavioral norms, such as non-use of prohibited
weaponry, minimization of collateral damage, and humane treatment of prisoners of war.”).
262. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
with Annex of Regulations, art. 23, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
263. COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN TREATY SERIES: CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME (2001).
264. See, e.g., Richemond-Barak, supra note 261 (“Non-state actors, which
are not party to treaty-based norms regulating the conduct of war, cannot be
assumed to operate on the basis of reciprocity.”).
265. See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 370 (“[E]ven if states agreed
among themselves to restrict military activities in cyberspace, such an agreement would not restrain nonstate actors, who may already have or will almost
certainly acquire military capabilities in cyberspace.”).
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“adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens
266
those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don’t.”
In addition to comity and reciprocity, unlike state adversaries, it is much more difficult to hold non-state adversaries
267
accountable to wartime laws and norms. With state-based
adversaries, traditional tools of international law and diplomacy can be used to hold them accountable for breaches of war268
time laws and norms (albeit not always with success). Nonstate adversaries like hackers, terrorists, and lone-wolf combatants are frequently much more difficult to trace and find, let
269
alone hold accountable. If a uniformed battalion of Russian
soldiers infiltrated and destroyed the servers of the New York
Stock Exchange, the American and international response
would likely use traditional tools of international law and diplomacy to hold Russia accountable for the battalion’s ac270
tions. However, if a nameless lone-wolf terrorist, claiming affiliation with no state and only an online movement, decides to
infiltrate and destroy the servers of the New York Stock Exchange, the American and international response to hold that
lone-wolf terrorist accountable would have to be more creative
and break from traditional laws and norms of war given the dif271
ficulties of identifying proper avenues for retaliation. In the
absence of clear international law and military mechanisms,

266. President Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace
(Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/
obama-lecture_en.html.
267. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 5, at 168–73 (discussing the equal application of international law among states); W. Michael Reisman, Assessing
Claims To Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 82 (2003); Waxman,
supra note 5, at 444 (discussing accountability challenges involved with nonstate actors).
268. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 130–33 (1985) (explaining how states can create accountability mechanisms via economic sanctions); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 225–26 (2005) (discussing the motivations and limitations of cooperation
among nations); Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 370–71; Mary Ellen O’Connell,
Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 445 (2005).
269. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance
with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 715 (2008) (“[N]on-state actors have no expectation of accountability for their non-compliance.”); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Lessons for Cyber
Security?, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Winter 2011, at 20.
270. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 238, at 97.
271. See, e.g., id.
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domestic criminal enforcement tools may be more feasible as a
near term tool for such serious transgressions.
Moreover, the issue of accountability is predicated on the
notion that wrongdoers can be properly identified for their misdeeds. International law generally requires the attribution of
an attack to a state actor before sanctioning a responsive pro272
portionate use of force. Further complicating matters is that
many non-state adversaries can reside in locales governed by
state adversaries or neutral states thereby making assistance
273
in identifying non-state adversaries that much more difficult.
For many actions by non-state adversaries, like those that use
financial cyber weapons, attribution can be particularly diffi274
cult or nearly impossible with a high degree of certainty. As
such, if attribution is uncertain, enforcement is frequently
275
unachievable at a just and satisfactory level.
* * *
276
The world changes swiftly, and the law changes slowly.
This Aesopian turtle and hare dynamic leads to tensions when
277
old rules meet new concerns in modern warfare. Innovations
at the intersection of modern war and finance exhibit this tense
278
dynamic. The Geneva Conventions, the body of treaties gov272. See Sklerov, supra note 231, at 38 (“[T]he prevailing view of international law requires states to attribute an attack to a state or its agents before
responding with force . . . .”).
273. See id.; George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1174–95 (2000) (discussing the issue of neutral
states in cyberwarfare).
274. See Jens David Ohlin, Cyber Causation, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7,
at 37–44; Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in Cyber Space: The
Evolving International Law of Attribution, 1 FLETCHER SEC. REV., no. 2, at 55
(2014); Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24,
2010, at 21, 23.
275. See COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND
USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 252–53 (2009); Marco Roscini, Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for Cyber
Operations, in CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 215–17.
276. See Eichensehr, supra note 221, at 358 (“New technologies pose challenges for law and for international law in particular. For as cumbersome and
slow as domestic law appears in many circumstances, developing international
law is often even more difficult.”).
277. See INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. ALL., supra note 94, at 6 (“National
and international laws, regulations, and enforcement are still struggling to
catch up to cyber activities worldwide.”); Koh, supra note 5, at 1772 (remarking on the legal challenges posed by emerging technologies).
278. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, Interna-
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erning wartime conduct, remain largely unchanged since the
years following World War II, despite revolutionary changes in
279
the world of weaponry and warfare. The disparate timelines
of law and war create significant tensions and unanswered
questions. In terms of financial warfare, answers to critical
questions concerning financial hostilities, cyberattacks, and
non-state adversaries remain works-in-progress and render
traditional rules of law impotent to fully address the dangers of
280
modern warfare and national security.
IV. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The new financial theater of war and its weapons demand
new laws and policies so as to better protect American interests
and the American homeland. In order to remain relevant, laws
and policies governing war must be updated in the same way
that law has historically responded to other critical social,
281
technological, and economic changes in the past. While many
larger legal and political questions concerning financial warfare
tional Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1855, 1856–57 (1997) (discussing how globalization has increased the burden
of capital market regulators to maintain adequate disclosure, antifraud, and
anti-manipulation rules); Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and
Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99, 114–15 (2002) (“The novelty of a weapon—
any weapon—always baffles statesmen and lawyers, many of whom are perplexed by technological innovations. . . . [A]fter a period of gestation, it usually
dawns on belligerent parties that there is no insuperable difficulty in applying
the general principles and rules of international law to the novel weapon
. . . .”); Whitehead, supra note 6, at 2–5 (noting the lack of regulatory innovation in response to financial innovation); Julia L. Chen, Note, Restoring Constitutional Balance: Accommodating the Evolution of War, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1767, 1788–92 (2012) (discussing how the new methodologies of warfare challenge traditional understandings of war powers).
279. Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 840.
280. See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 380 (“The intersovereign issues
posed by cyber are more complicated and will probably take even longer to
solve.”).
281. See ZARATE, supra note 1, at 356 (“The financial battlespace is constantly evolving . . . . Our enemies are smart and will continue to adapt, taking advantage of the growing complexity and sophistication of international
financial systems. We, too, must adapt . . . .”); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474–75 (1897) (articulating the necessity of law to
adapt itself to novel technology); Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First
Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 725, 745–46 (2013) (espousing changes and breaks in international lawmaking from past customs and
practices); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes entail
the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows
to meet the demands of society.”).
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highlighted in the previous Part remain unresolved, a nation’s
right to reasonably protect its financial infrastructure and financial interests from legitimate threats should not be ques282
tioned. While broader, international, and multilateral consensus remains forthcoming, domestic actions can be taken
with greater urgency to better focus public and private re283
sources on financial warfare in a coordinated manner. To better enhance financial defenses and capabilities, policymakers
should introduce innovative cybersecurity incentives, advanced
technological stress tests, and comprehensive financial war
games to intelligently marshal public and private actors
against the emerging threats posed by the financial weapons of
war.
A. CYBERSECURITY INCENTIVES
Since much of modern finance operates predominantly in a
privately held cyberspace infrastructure, policymakers should
design incentives that encourage private businesses to expeditiously enhance their cybersecurity capabilities in response to
284
the emerging threats of financial weapons of war. Because
much of the critical financial infrastructure is owned and oper285
ated by private businesses, and because such businesses are
frequently motivated by profits, carefully calibrated incentives
may be necessary to spur timely cybersecurity improvements

282. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51; DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE GEN.
COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS
15–18 (1999); Jensen, supra note 94, at 230 (“International law is clear in regard to passive measures: every nation has the right to protect its computer
systems by such means, just as it would its own airspace or territory.”).
283. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15–23
(2004) (arguing how emerging international issues can be better addressed
through “government networks” constituted by legislators, regulators, and
private stakeholders); Koh, supra note 281, at 743 (discussing the growing
utility of “hybrid private-public arrangements” to address issues with international implications).
284. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at xxii (“Defending computer networks,
and launching attacks on them, requires the participation, willing or otherwise, of the private sector.”); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or
Cyberwar?: International Law, Domestic Law, and Self-Protective Measures, in
CYBERWAR, supra note 7, at 192–93 (highlighting the need for “improved software engineering”); Sales, supra note 7, at 1550–52 (discussing the use of carrots and sticks to improve cybersecurity); Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching,
and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 173 (2005).
285. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 350 (“[P]rivate parties own the majority of the underlying infrastructure that supports the cyber domain.”).
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and investments. In the absence of incentives, investments in
cybersecurity may remain stagnant as businesses focus on their
bottom line rather than their information security and institu286
tional stability.
A pure market-based approach towards cybersecurity may
be inadequate for building better defenses against dynamic
287
threats. In the past couple of years alone, over half a billion
people had their identities stolen online, President Obama’s
credit card was breached, and the White House, the State Department, Target, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Home Depot all suf288
Despite serious and
fered serious cybersecurity breaches.
persistent threats, it has been estimated that financial firms
only invested approximately seven percent of their information
technology budgets on security in recent years, though invest289
ments are growing in response to increased threats. J.P.
Morgan Chase, for instance, invested “more than $250 million,
and had approximately 1,000 people focused on cybersecurity
efforts” in 2014 alone, expecting significantly increased invest290
ments in the near future. While some companies have made
significant proactive cybersecurity investments, many have not.
And to the extent incremental improvements are made, they
are often done in a reactionary manner following some major
security breach, so policy incentives may be necessary to encourage more proactive and timely behavior among more pri291
vate firms.
286. See STEWART BAKER ET AL., MCAFEE, IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 14 (2009); NY DEP’T OF FIN. SERV.,
REPORT ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR 11 (May 2014) (highlighting resource constraints and stale software as ongoing challenges for financial cybersecurity); Nicole Perlroth, Hacked vs. Hackers: Game On, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at F1 (reporting on the lack of urgency regarding
cybersecurity).
287. JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT
MATRIX OF DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 239 (2011).
288. See Perlroth, supra note 286.
289. See Sales, supra note 7, at 1538–39; Daniel Huang et al., Financial
Firms Boost Cybersecurity Funds, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 17, 2014, at C3.
290. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 142 (Feb.
24, 2015); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 66 (Aug.
3, 2015) (“In each of 2015 and 2016, the Firm expects its annual cybersecurity
spending to be nearly double what it was in 2014 in order to enhance its defense capabilities.”).
291. Huang et al., supra note 289; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Matthew
Goldstein, After Breach, Push To Close Security Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2014, at B1; see, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 791, 848–50 (2015) (discussing various political tools for encour-
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Tax law, if properly calibrated, can serve as one such incentive-oriented policy to encourage private financial industry
actors to enhance their cyber defenses in a timely manner.
Through a combination of tax credits, bonus depreciation, and
increased deductions, policymakers can encourage the replacement of outdated, vulnerable information systems and greater
292
investment in better, more secured systems. Following the
recent financial crisis, pursuant to the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, policymakers used tax policy to incentivize
private businesses to accelerate and enlarge capital invest293
ments to help stimulate the economy. Similarly, such incentive-driven policies can be utilized to motivate private financial
industry participants to act more expediently towards enhancing cybersecurity as a part of enhancing American financial security.
Beyond tax policy, the federal government can also create
294
better incentives through its vast procurement powers. The
federal government can become a more active and public buyer
or sponsor in the growing market for cyber weapons, cyber defenses, and so-called zero-day exploits, which are vulnerabili295
ties unknown to a program’s administrator. If direct, open
aging better cybersecurity).
292. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BONUS DEPRECIATION: ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY ISSUES 4 (2014); GARY GUENTHER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., SECTION 179 AND BONUS DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS,
AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 1 (2014); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY 3–24 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf; ERIC
ZWICK & JAMES MAHON, DO FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AMPLIFY FISCAL POLICY?
EVIDENCE FROM BUSINESS INVESTMENT STIMULUS 39 (Jan. 7, 2014), http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/zwick/files; James M. Williamson & John L. Pender,
Economic Stimulus and the Tax Code: The Impact of the Gulf Opportunity
Zone, 1 Pub. Fin. Rev. 3 (2014), http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/12/
11/1091142114557724.full.pdf.
293. Business Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/Business-Provisions
-of-the-American-Recovery-and-Reinvestment-Act-of-2009-(ARRA) (last updated Mar. 19, 2014).
294. See, e.g., Daniel P. Gitterman, The American Presidency and the Power of the Purchaser, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 225, 225–29 (2013) (describing
the use of procurement to shape public policy).
295. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60
EMORY L.J. 1051, 1067–68 (2011) (discussing the growing market for cyber
weapons and cyber defenses); Grossman, supra note 164, at 20–21 (reporting
on the market for computer bugs, viruses, and vulnerabilities); Serena Saitto,
The Big Business of Smashing Bugs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 16,
2015, at 41 (highlighting the rise of the “bug bounty” marketplace).
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federal government participation is too controversial, the federal government can also offer certain benefits or subsidies to
those who sell exclusively to the American government or legit296
imate, white-hat American corporations. Private firms like
Google and Microsoft already participate in this cyber arms
297
marketplace. It has been documented that Google is willing
to pay sums up to $60,000 for vulnerabilities in its Chrome
browser; and Microsoft is willing to pay up to $100,000 for vul298
nerabilities in its software programs. The participation of the
federal government, directly or indirectly, through mechanisms
like prizes and bounties in this marketplace could help assure
that these cyber arms are not unleashed on American financial
interests.
In addition to participating in the market for cyber weapons through its procurement powers, the federal government
can also encourage timely cybersecurity improvements by private financial firms by expressing a contracting preference for
firms that meet certain government cybersecurity benchmarks,
if those benchmarks are regularly updated to be responsive to
299
the current threats in cyberspace. Because the federal government is one of the largest purchasers of goods and services
in the world, such contracting preferences could lead to signifi300
cant system-wide improvements in cybersecurity. The federal
government already has cybersecurity requirements for many
of its vendors, but it can do more to make sure that its
301
cybersecurity requirements reflect the latest cyberthreats. In
fact, in 2015, the Office of Management and Budget initiated a
review of current acquisition practices with an eye towards enhancing cybersecurity through the federal procurement pro302
cess.
296. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1087–88 (advocating for a government “bug bounty” program to purchase computer viruses and other malicious software).
297. See ZETTER, supra note 178, at 100.
298. Id. at 102.
299. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1062–63 (suggesting implementation of IT requirements as a condition of contracting with the government);
see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 286 (discussing underinvestment by private
firms in cybersecurity).
300. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1062–63; Gitterman, supra note 294
(examining the power of the president to shape policy using procurement).
301. See Security Requirements for Unclassified Information Resources, 48
C.F.R. § 552.239-71 (2015).
302. Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions Public
Comment Space, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://policy.cio.gov (last visit-
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While the threats of cyberattacks are well known in the financial industry, the common business instincts to increase
earnings and decrease expenditures may prevent businesses
from behaving in the proactive and timely manner that is most
303
beneficial to them and to the entire financial system. It may
be necessary for the government to initiate and coordinate
304
some of the desired outcomes. Proper public policy incentives
could mitigate some of the collective action problems associated
305
Moreover, because private enterprises
with cybersecurity.
play such critically important roles in modern finance, enhancements of our national cybersecurity without complementary private enhancements would be incomplete, and would
leave the homeland very vulnerable to various financial weap306
ons of war. As such, incentive-oriented policies may be necessary to improve the overall security of the financial system.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL STRESS TESTS
Policymakers should design advanced technological stress
tests to assess the information technology infrastructure of systemically important private and public financial institutions
307
and agencies. These tech stress tests should be constructed
and implemented to analyze the capabilities and vulnerabilities
of the information technology systems of these entities similar
to how banking regulators imposed capital stress tests to large
financial institutions following the financial crisis. They can be
administered through a federal agency apparatus like the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and

ed Mar. 7, 2016).
303. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1036 (“Rational vendors will accordingly skimp on security investments, at least at the margins, since they
will likely not be able to recover those costs via higher prices that correlate
with higher quality.”).
304. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584,
662–64 (2011) (discussing the need for government regulation to encourage
private companies to cooperate with one another to decrease cyber security
risk).
305. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1031 (“[C]ybersecurity suffers from a
collective-action problem.”).
306. See Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and
U.S. Cyber Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense Program Before the S. Comm. on
Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 32 (2013) (statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal).
307. See, e.g., James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, Jr. et al., Cybersecurity’s Human Factor: Lessons from the Pentagon, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2015, at 86, 94
(discussing use of operational tests to enhance cybersecurity).
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308

Communications Integration Center. These tests can help
address some of the informational challenges associated with
309
cybersecurity. They can provide policymakers and key industry stakeholders with a more holistic, mosaic view of the
cyberthreats being experienced by the financial system rather
than just seeing glimpses of the threats based on firm-by-firm
310
disclosures. The proposed technological stress tests can also
create more opportunities for firms to share information and
learn from one another. The fact of the matter is that in an age
of persistent cyberattacks, no technological defense is failsafe
311
and no weapon can serve as a complete deterrence. As such,
private and public financial stakeholders must periodically
learn about their own vulnerabilities as well as system-wide
vulnerabilities so as to build better defenses.
The recommendation of advanced technological stress tests
is neither radical nor wholly unprecedented. The Pentagon and
many financial institutions already voluntarily, or as part of legal requirements, conduct some periodic testing with regards to
312
their cybersecurity. Plus, the law also already requires many
financial institutions to meet certain minimum informational
safeguards. Pursuant to the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Coordinators, the financial industry established the Financial SectorInformation Sharing and Analysis Centers to help aggregate
313
and share information about cybersecurity threats. The Fi308. See generally National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity
Center,
HOMELAND
-communications-integration-center (last updated Jan. 19, 2016) (describing
the role of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center).
309. See Bambauer, supra note 7, at 1035 (explaining how information
asymmetries are obstacles for better cybersecurity).
310. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 156, at 34–36.
311. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 367 (opining that no state has a failsafe technological infrastructure); Lynn, supra note 238, at 97; Nye, supra
note 269.
312. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R.
§ 314.3–4 (2015); Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, 4 NAT’L EXAM
PROGRAM RISK ALERT 2 (2015) (“The vast majority of examined firms conduct
periodic risk assessments, on a firm-wide basis, to identify cybersecurity
threats, vulnerabilities, and potential business consequences.”).
313. Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Coordinators, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,804, 41,804–06 (Aug. 5, 1998); About
FS-ISAC, FIN. SERVS. INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTR., https://www.fsisac
.com/about (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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nancial Services Modernization Act of 1999 mandates that regulated institutions meet certain benchmarks for protecting the
314
financial information of their customers. Similarly, the Pentagon also runs annual tests on all of its major weapon sys315
tems, including assessments for cybersecurity. More recently,
in 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority also recommended third-party penetration testing for financial firms
as a way to assess their cybersecurity feasibility and vulnera316
bility. And in 2015, collectives of private firms created platforms like Soltra and ThreatExchange to share information
317
about cyberthreats.
In recognition of the persistent and growing threats of
cyber weapons to our critical infrastructure, policymakers have
recently taken more steps to enhance our cybersecurity capabilities. In 2013, Congress introduced the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act to enhance the cyber infrastructure of
the country, particularly the parts that are controlled by pri318
vate firms who are less likely to work together. Because that
bill did not become law, President Obama signed an executive
order focused on improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s
319
critical infrastructure. As previously noted, the executive order, among other matters, established the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
to encourage more collaboration and information sharing
among public and private stakeholders on best practices in
320
cybersecurity. Given the importance of our financial system,
efforts to better protect our critical infrastructure from
cyberattacks should include our financial infrastructure and its
314. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012) (establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 15 U.S.C. § 6801–09 (2012) (mandating protection
of customer information); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–314.5 (2002) (regulation effecting
the statutory mandate).
315. ODOTE, supra note 161, at 331–37.
316. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 156, at 34 (highlighting the importance of information sharing in cybersecurity).
317. Press Release, Soltra, New Soltra Network Offering To Connect and
Coordinate Cyber Threat Sharing (Oct. 12, 2015), https://soltra.com/
pdf/Soltra%20Network%20Press%20Release%20101215.pdf; Threatexchange,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/threatexchange/info (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
318. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong.
(2013).
319. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (2013).
320. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2013).
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key participants. And advanced technological stress tests can
be a step in that direction.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, large financial institutions with assets over $50 billion in the United States were
subject to capital stress tests to assess the adequacy of their re321
serves in the event of another financial crisis. These financial
institutions were subject to a host of hypothetical adverse economic and financial scenarios to test their vulnerability and vi322
ability under certain hypothetical dire circumstances. These
hypothetical nightmare scenarios include a parade of economic
horrors like sudden drops in gross domestic product, spikes in
323
unemployment, and crashes in housing prices. The Federal
Reserve and the relevant financial institutions conducted these
stress tests under the auspices of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Programs (SCAP), Comprehensive Capital Analysis
and Review (CCAR), and Dodd-Frank Act stress testing
(DFAST), which were all implemented following the financial
324
crisis. Foreign banking regulators have also implemented
similar stress tests for their systemically important financial
325
institutions. These stress tests, while imperfect, can nonetheless provide valuable information for policymakers and tested
326
financial institutions.
321. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) (2012) (calling for development of standards to
apply to banks with assets in excess of $50 billion); Supervisory Stress Test
Requirements for U.S. Bank Holding Companies with $50 Billion or More in
Total Consolidated Assets and Nonbank Financial Companies Supervised by
the Board, 12 C.F.R. § 252.41–47 (2015) (implementing stress tests); DAVID
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 77–80 (2011) (noting special requirements for banks with over $50 billion in assets); Baradaran, supra note 6, at
1250–51 (critiquing stress tests).
322. See Baradaran, supra note 6, at 1283 (describing stress tests); Robert
Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98
MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2238–39 (2014) (describing what stress tests reveal).
323. Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Mar. 7, 2013) http://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130307a.htm.
324. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT
STRESS TEST 2014: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 1
(2014).
325. See, e.g., EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., 2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST AGGREGATE REPORT 2–4 (2011) (reporting results of 2011 stress test); Andrew
Haldane, Exec. Dir. for Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the MarcusEvans Conference on Stress Testing: Why Banks Failed the Stress Test (Feb.
13, 2009), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/
speeches/2009/speech374.pdf (describing stress testing in the United Kingdom).
326. See Policy Statement on Scenario Design Framework for Stress Test-
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Because the modern financial industry is essentially a
high-tech industry, stress tests akin to those that test capital
adequacy should be conducted to test the technological capabilities and vulnerabilities of our critical financial institutions and
agencies when subject to adverse technological situations. Similar to the capital stress tests, the detailed results of these tests
will remain confidential so that vulnerabilities within an institution or the system are not disclosed to our adversaries. Like
the capital stress tests, the technological stress tests will include large financial institutions like investment banks, but also critically important financial infrastructure participants like
stock exchanges, mutual funds, and clearinghouses. Additionally, unlike the capital stress tests, the key financial regulators
such as the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, the Treasury Department, and the Labor
Department would also be subject to these technological stress
tests because of their systemic importance and because they
327
may have unknown vulnerabilities. In fact, in recent years,
mindful of potential cyber breaches of confidential financial information, major financial institutions have bolstered their own
technological defenses and have also encouraged their outside
328
law firms to enhance their cybersecurity. Ultimately, because
of the interconnected nature of the modern financial system
and its heavy dependence on information technology, it is imperative that critical institutions are technologically well-

ing, 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 app. A(1)(e) (2014) (“[Stress testing is] a valuable supervisory tool that provides a forward-looking assessment of large financial companies’ capital adequacy under hypothetical economic and financial market
conditions.”); SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS OF 2008 26 (2009) (discussing various problems
in connection with capital stress testing); Baradaran, supra note 6, at 1250–53
(highlighting shortcomings of financial stress testing); M. Todd Henderson &
Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003,
1021–23 (2012) (discussing the failings of banking examiners, including those
associated with stress testing).
327. See, e.g., DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 4–5 (Sept. 15, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/2178548/oig-report.pdf (detailing vulnerabilities in the information
systems at the Treasury Department).
328. Matthew Goldstein, Law Firms Are Pressed on Security for Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2014, at B1; Huang et al., supra note 289; Carter Dougherty,
Banks Dreading Computer Hacks Call for Cyber War Council, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 8, 2014 10:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-07-08/banks-dreading-computer-hacks-call-for-cyber-war-council.
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equipped to handle technological stresses and threats from for329
eign and domestic adversaries.
C. WAR GAMES
Policymakers should design comprehensive military exercises that include serious threats to the American financial system and American financial interests to better prepare for
330
modern conflicts and warfare. These war games should marshal military resources, as well as private resources to participate in these exercises. The Departments of Defense, Homeland
Security, and Treasury can serve as the leading and coordinating agencies for these exercises that involve public agencies as
well as private institutions. The participation of private institutions is critically important to having effective war games because private firms play such an important role in the global
331
Private
financial infrastructure and in financial warfare.
firms like banks, clearinghouses, and exchanges are at the
frontlines of the financial theater of war, and they can certainly
play a more active role in enhancing our national security read332
iness and our recovery capabilities. Just as war games have
long assisted the military in preparing for conflict in the theaters of land, air, and sea, these war games can help the military
and private firms better prepare for conflicts in the financial
333
theater of war. Whereas the technological stress tests are
329. See Eichensehr, supra note 7, at 368 (“[I]ncreased investment in and
dependence on the Internet and cyber more generally increase a state’s vulnerability to attack.”).
330. Professor Mehrsa Baradaran has proposed using financial war games,
in addition to stress tests, to better assess the strengths and weaknesses of
financial institutions. See Baradaran, supra note 6, at 1319; see also John
Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: The Problem of (In)experience and
Regulator Expertise, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 168–74 (2014) (describing various benefits of using financial crises simulations).
331. See Gordon, supra note 135, at 510–17 (explicating on the important
role of private firms in combatting terrorism financing); Sales, supra note 7, at
1567 (“[T]he private sector should play an active role in establishing industrywide cyber-security standards . . . .”); Matthew Goldstein, Wall St. and Law
Firm Plan Cooperative Body To Bolster Online Security, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2015, at B7; see also DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR
OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 8–9 (2011) (advocating for more partnerships between the public agencies and the private sector to enhance cybersecurity).
332. See, e.g., Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 515–23 (suggesting that
American financial institutions can do significantly better to detect and deter
funding for terrorism).
333. For an introduction to the role of war games throughout history, see
generally FRANCIS J. MCHUGH, FUNDAMENTALS OF WARGAMING (3d ed. 1966);
PETER P. PERLA, THE ART OF WARGAMING (1990); JON PETERSON, PLAYING AT
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primarily structured, targeted exercises, the proposed war
games would be comprehensive operational exercises that account for analog weapons as well as cyber weapons with considerably less predictability and more unintended scenarios. If
properly designed, financial war games better prepare policymakers to anticipate the complexities surrounding financial
334
warfare.
War games have long been used by militaries, here and
335
abroad, to enhance readiness and national defenses. Early
variations of chess date back to 3000 B.C. and were considered
336
to be one of the first forms of war games. War games simulate
potential threats and attacks in a semi-controlled environment
where its participants can better learn about their strengths
337
and vulnerabilities in a dynamic setting. During the Cold
War, the Pentagon ran a series of hypothetical and operational
exercises to test the efficacy of the U.S. military in connection
338
to certain adverse scenarios occurring in Europe and Asia.
Since 1982, the United States and Thailand have spearheaded
large-scale operational war games called Cobra Gold, which
presently includes Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and
339
South Korea. More recently, in connection with emerging
threats posed by China and North Korea, the United States
and South Korea also run one of the largest full-scale military
340
exercises called Foal Eagle annually to test their readiness.
THE WORLD: A HISTORY OF SIMULATING WARS, PEOPLE AND
VENTURES, FROM CHESS TO ROLE-PLAYING GAMES (2012).

FANTASTIC AD-

334. See, e.g., Robert C. Rubel, The Epistemology of War Gaming, 59 NAVAL
WAR C. REV. 108, 112 (2006) (“Games allow players and observers to see relationships—geographic, temporal, functional, political, and other—that would
otherwise not be possible to discern. Seeing and understanding these relationships prepares the mind for decisions in a complex environment.”).
335. See Baradaran, supra note 6, at 1319 (“The military has used war
games for many years, both as a test of the military’s responsiveness to crises
and as a way to devise military strategies.”).
336. See MCHUGH, supra note 333, at 27.
337. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02: DICTIONARY OF MILITARY
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 395 (2011) (defining a war game as “[a] simulation, by
whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces,
using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real
life situation”).
338. Thomas B. Allen, Twilight Zone in the Pentagon, in THE COLD WAR: A
MILITARY HISTORY 230, 230–34 (Robert Cowley ed., 2005).
339. Ralf Emmers, Security and Power Balancing: Singapore’s Response to
the US Rebalance in Asia, in THE NEW US STRATEGY TOWARDS ASIA 143, 146
(William T. Tow & Douglas Stuart eds., 2015).
340. See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN & ASHLEY HESS, THE EVOLVING MILITARY BALANCE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIA, VOLUME II:
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Approximately 10,000 U.S. troops from the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Special Operations Forces were involved in the 2013
341
Foal Eagle war games alone.
As the nature of war evolves to include more non-state adversaries, cyber weapons, and analog financial weapons, the
military must work closer with key private institutions to design war games that better prepare for attacks that attempt to
disrupt and destroy our financial system and financial inter342
ests. Osama Bin Laden did not choose to attack the World
Trade Center in New York City by accident. He chose the Twin
Towers and New York City because of their economic and fi343
nancial importance to the United States. These war games
should account for tactics like coordinated economic sanctions
by competing nation-states, attacks to disrupt our financial infrastructure, efforts to manipulate our capital markets,
schemes to decimate our economic strength, and attempts to
physically destroy our financial institutions. Financial war
344
games can help us think like the enemy. They can help our
military, law enforcement, and private institutions prepare for
terrorists using alternative funding sources like peer-to-peer
345
lending, bitcoins, and crowdfunding to finance their activities.
Financial war games can also help our military prepare for horrific scenarios like the seizure of American banking interests
abroad, the commandeering of the New York Stock Exchange
servers, the injection of false data into our bond markets, a
sudden, massive sale of U.S. Treasury bonds, and the bombing
of major investment banks in New York. Through significantly
realistic simulated scenarios, war games can provide incredibly
valuable intelligence to public policymakers and private firms
346
of their strengths and vulnerabilities.
CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, ASYMMETRIC FORCES, AND US FORCES 178 (2013).
341. Id.
342. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 94, at 2 (discussing the core missions of
the Department of Defense including defending the United States against
cyberattacks that may have significant economic and financial consequences).
343. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 151–53 (2004); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWERS: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 348 (2005).
344. See generally MICAH ZENKO, RED TEAM: HOW TO SUCCEED BY THINKING LIKE THE ENEMY (2015).
345. See, e.g., Rick Rojas & Ian Lovett, Buyer of Guns Used in Attack Is
Studied, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2015, at A14 (reporting on how the terrorists in
the 2015 San Bernardino attack used online peer-to-peer lending site, Proper,
to arrange for a loan).
346. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 116, at 34–
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This proposal for comprehensive operational financial war
games that includes private and public sector actors is not entirely unprecedented. Mindful of the utility of war games in
connection with financial weapons, in 2009, the U.S. military
and intelligence officials conducted one of the first reported
economic war games at the Johns Hopkins University Warfare
Analysis Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland, to test the use of financial weapons against the United States by a foreign nation
347
like China. Recent efforts like the National Cyber-Forensics
& Training Alliance, a non-profit corporation established by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to marshal public and private
sector resources to share information, expertise, and resources
to combat threats to cybersecurity, may serve as a good model
348
for designing more comprehensive financial war games. Since
2011, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association has been running major cyberattack simulations called
Quantum Dawn with private partners and federal agencies to
better prepare the financial industry against a systemic
349
cyberattack.
While no war game can perfectly simulate an actual war, a
good war game can nonetheless be incredibly illuminating in
helping public and private institutions better plan for financial
warfare, so that they do not react in a rash, ad-hoc manner dur350
ing times of crisis. As former President and General Dwight
Eisenhower famously remarked about war preparations: “In
preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless,
351
but planning is indispensable.” To date, it is difficult to say
35 (discussing the need to gather better information in connection with combatting terrorist financing); SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS: THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION STATE 199 (2009) (suggesting that civilian
firms should take a more active role in cyberwarfare in partnership with the
military).
347. WEINER, supra note 17, at 13–14.
348. See Nicole Hong, Pittsburgh at Fore of Cybercrime Fight, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 14, 2015, at A3; NAT’L CYBER-FORENSICS & TRAINING ALL., https://
www.ncfta.net (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
349. See Fact Sheet: Quantum Dawn 3, SIFMA 1, http://www.sifma.org/
uploadedfiles/services/bcp/quantum-dawn-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 7,
2016); Quantum Dawn 3 After-Action Report, SIFMA 3 (Nov. 23, 2015), http://
www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/services/bcp/quantumdawn-3-after-action-report
.pdf.
350. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or
Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 49–59 (2009) (describing the ad-hoc responses of policymakers following the recent financial crisis).
351. RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 235 (1962) (quoting Dwight Eisenhow-
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that we cannot plan better, or do more, to protect our homeland
and our financial interests from potential and persistent at352
tacks from our enemies with financial weapons of war. And
comprehensive financial war games that marshal public and
private resources in design and operation can serve as a meaningful early step towards creating better defenses against cyber
353
weapons and analog weapons in modern financial warfare.
CONCLUSION
Financial warfare will be one of the most pressing challenges for political leaders, military commanders, financial
regulators, and corporate executives in the near future. The
emergence and confluence of analog and cyber financial weapons will pose some of the most vexing and daunting threats for
law and society in the coming years. Every nation-state, every
major financial institution, and every citizen could be at risk of
suffering direct harms and collateral damage.
This Article provides an early exploration of modern financial warfare. It examines the new battlefield of the modern financial infrastructure, classifies the growing arsenal of financial weapons, highlights emerging legal and policy tensions,
and offers three pragmatic recommendations for better safeguarding the homeland and the global financial system in current and future financial wars. Throughout its analysis, this
Article is mindful of the longstanding international legal considerations involved with war and finance, but it is also aware
of the critical need for swift and thoughtful actions to better
protect American interests. In the end, this Article aspires to
serve as an early, optimistic blueprint for further study on how
best to think and act anew with urgency about modern financial warfare and the financial weapons of war.
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